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January 30, 1993 marked the sixtieth anniversary of Adolf Hitler's
ascendancy to power in Germany. The last decades have witnessed an
exponential growth in books and articles describing and analyzing the Third
Reich. Virtually every aspect of government and society during the reign of
National Socialism has been deciphered and discussed. The scholarly
searchlight, however, has rarely focused on the legal system. The interested
reader will find few English language discussions of the philosophy, structure
and operation of the Nazi judiciary.'
The evolution and function of the legal system in the Third Reich
continues to merit our attention. How could a relatively advanced judicial
system degenerate into barbarism? Do we confront a similar danger? Events
in this period also have profound ethical import. Following the war, various
governmental lawyers and judges who were responsible for erecting and
administering the Nazi courts of terror were adjudged to be internationally
liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This prosecution clearly
established that legal officers and officials have obligations which transcend
the demands of domestic law. These judgments unfortunately have had little
deterrent impact. Non-democratic regimes continue to aspire to emulate the
Nazi's model of totalitarian law. In order to achieve this goal, these regimes
have launched relentless attacks against the judiciary. Various judges,
unfortunately, have responded by tailoring their decisions to the demands of
dictators. The National Socialist ideology permeated every aspect of the law
in Germany. The consequences of this philosophy emerge most starkly in
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1. For a comprehensive assessment of the historical literature on the holocaust, see MICHAEL
R. MARRUS, THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORY (1987).
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criminal law and procedure and it is this area which will be the focus of this
essay. The architecture of the Nazi legal system initially is described. This
is followed by a brief discussion of the post-war prosecution and punishment
of Nazi lawyers and judges. In conclusion, the global effort to safeguard the
independence of judges is outlined and the international community is urged
to adopt a declaration which guarantees the independence of the judiciary.
I. THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE THIRD REICH
A. The Emergence Of The Nazi Party
On January 30, 1933, President Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
appointed Adolf Hitler, leader of the National Socialist German Workers'
Party (NSDAP), to the Chancellorship of Germany. Hitler seemed an
unlikely choice.2 Adolf "Schicklgruber" had devoted his energies since
1919 to building the pan-German and anti-semitic NSDAP or Nazi Party into
a political force? Under normal conditions, the platform of these farsical
fanatics likely would have fallen on fallow fields. However, post-World War
I Germany provided fertile ground for Hitler's appeals. 4 Many Germans felt
humiliated by their defeat and by the terms of the Versailles Treaty.5 The
country was burdened by war reparations, 6 humiliated by France's occupa-
tion of the German industrial heartland in the Ruhre and overwhelmed by
inflation and unemployment!
These strains propelled voters into the ranks of various right and left-
wing fringe parties.9 The number of parties proliferated. In 1930, ten
parties attracted over a million votes and no single party or group of parties
was able to construct a governing coalition.'0 Attempts at alliance fell
victim to inter-party competition, backroom bargaining and conspiratorial
connivance.11 With parliament paralyzed by partisanship, President Hinden-
burg authorized Chancellor Heinrich Bruening to govern through the use of
extra-parliamentary emergency decrees.
12
2. WIUIAM L SHRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI
GERMANY 18-19 (1960).
3. Id. at 60-61. Schicklgruber was his father's name before it was changed to Hitler. Id. at
22-23.
4. Id. at 68-69.
5. Id. at 90-91.
6. Id. at 91, 95.
7. Id. at 95.
8. Id. at 192.
9. AUAN BUL2.DCK, A STUDY IN TYRANNY 217-18 (rev. ed. 1962).
10. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 212-23.
11. Id. at 225-29.
12. Id. at 213.
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Germany, politically divided, economically destitute and stricken by
street crime, turned to the Nazi Party. By July 1932, the National Socialists
had become the plurality party in parliament. 3 In 1933, eighty-five year
old President Hindenburg reluctantly requested the "Austrian Corporal,"
Adolf Hitler, to form a government. 4 Hitler named a new cabinet which
was comprised of eight conservatives and two Nazis, Wilhelm Frick and
Hermann Goering."
This was the death knell for the Weimar Constitution of 1919 which was
"on paper, the most liberal and democratic document of its kind the twentieth
century had seen, mechanically well-nigh perfect, full of ingenious and
admirable devices which seemed to guarantee the working of an almost
flawless democracy. " "
On [the] wintry morning of January 30, 1933, the tragedy of the
Weimar Republic, of the bungling attempt for fourteen frustrating years of
the Germans to make democracy work, had come to an end....
In this way, by way of the back door, by means of a shabby political
deal with the old-school reactionaries he [Hitler] privately detested, the
former tramp from Vienna, the derelict of the First World War, the violent
revolutionary, became Chancellor of the great nation.' 7
B. Hitler's Legal Cosmology
Hitler's views on law were sketchy. He paid little attention to jurispru-
dence in his rambling, incoherent and often contradictory magnum opus of
1925, Mein Kampf.'8 Any attempt to summarize Hitler's thought runs the
risk of crediting him with greater coherence than is merited.
Hitler's core belief was that people were divided into a racial hierarchy.
At the top stood the Aryan. He wrote that "[i]f we were to divide mankind
into three groups, the founders of culture, the bearers of culture, the
destroyers of culture, only the Aryan could be considered as the representa-
tive of the first group." 9 The role of the lower racial groups in Hitler's
view was to serve as beasts of burden for the brahmins of the Aryan race.'
Inter-marriage between the Aryans and the so-call inferior races, according
13. Id. at 233, 241.
14. Id. at 256-57.
15. Id. at 258. Frick was Minister of the Interior and Goering was Minister without Portfolio.
Goering also was named to be Minister of the Interior of Prussia, an office which enabled him
to control the Prussian police. Id.
16. Id. at 88-89. The Constitution provided for popular sovereignty, freedom of speech,
assembly and religion and equality before the law. Id. at 89.
17. Id. at 257.
18. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (Ralph Manheim trans. 1943). Hitler wrote this volume
while in jail following his unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 104-19.
19. HITLER, supra note 18, at 290.
20. Id. at 294-95.
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to Hitler, will inexorably lead to "blood poisoning" and to national
disintegration.21
In Hitler's genealogical scheme, the Jews were the most pernicious racial
strand.' They were responsible for propagating the false and dangerous
dogma of Marxism which erroneously viewed class conflict rather than race
as the driving force of history.'
Was there any form of filth or profligacy, particularly in cultural
life, without at least one Jew involved m it?
If you cut even cautiously into such an abscess, you found, like a
maggot in a rotting body, often dazzled by the sudden light-a kike!'
The calling of the so-called Folk (Volk) State, in Hitler's view, was to
preserve and to promote the Aryan people.
Anyone who speaks of a mission of the German people on earth
must know that it can exist only in the formation of a state which sees its
highest task in the preservation and promotion of the most nobile elements
ofour nationality, indeed of all mankind, which still remains intact.?
The crown of the folkish state's entire work of education and
training must be to burn the racial sense and racial feeling into the instinct
and the intellect, the heart and brain of the youth entrusted to it. No boy
and no girl must leave school without having been led to an ultimate
realization of the necessity and essence of blood purity.26
Hitler viewed the role of law in the Folk State as the promotion and
protection of the Aryan race. Hitler wrote that it "should not be forgotten
that the highest aim of human existence is not the preservation of a state, let
alone a government, but the preservation of the species."27 A government
which failed to fulfill this mandate, in Hitler's view, should be over-
thrown.' At his 1924 trial for helping to lead the infamous Beer Hall
Putsch against the German regime, Hitler argued that he was justified in
attempting to depose the Berlin government.
21. Id. at 562.
22. Id. at 21.
23. Id. at 65.
24. Id. at 57.
25. Id. at 397-98 (emphasis omitted).
26. Id. at 427 (emphasis omitted).
27. Id. at 96.
28. Id. Hitler believed that a German regime which failed to promote and protect the support
the superiority of the Aryan race was contravening natural law. Such a regime thus was entitled
to the obedience of the citizenry. He wrote that "[hluman law cancels out state law." Id. A
people which was unable or unwilling to fight for its existence was not entitled to survive:
"Providence in its eternal justice has decreed that people's end." Id.
[Vol. 23
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'The judges of this state may go right ahead and convict us for our
actions at that time, but History, acting as the goddess of a higher truth and
a higher justice will one day smilingly tear up this verdict, acquitting us of
all guilt and blame.'
And then she will call all those before her judgment seat, who today,
in possession of power, trample justice and law underfoot, who have led
our people into misery and ruin and amid the misfortune of the father land
have valued their own ego above the life of the community.39
The principles of National Socialist law remained opaque. Nevertheless,
Article 19 of the 1920 "Programme of the German Workers' Party"
demanded that "Roman Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be
replaced by a German common law."' Hitler derisively dismissed the
existing legal code as "'Romano-Jewish-Byzantine'" law.31 The latter was
characterized as individualistic and mechanical. In contrast, Teutonic law
was described as the product of an altruistic and collective sensibility. It was
depicted as being based on emotion and romanticism rather than on reason,
and was described as a product of common blood rather than of shared
history.32 According to Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, only "a pure
race can create a pure legal conscience. . . . Among all races, the Aryans
alone count ... [and is] creative of cultural values .... [L]aw is not a
technique or a science, but innate and transmitted only by blood; so that only
he who enjoys the proper racial inheritance has the creative spirit of law."33
Of course, the call for the replacement of the so-called Roman codes with a
German common law was a preposterous notion. The codes imported,
developed and refined in Germany already were thoroughly infused with
Germanic elements.' At any rate, it was completely unrealistic to propose
replacing the existing legal order with "Germanic laws of the middle ages,
intended for a purely agricultural and feudal society."35
29. Id. at 686.
30. 1 NAZISM 1919-1945: A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS, THE
NAZI PARTY, STATE AND SOCIETY 1919-1939 14, 15 (J. Noakes & G. Pridham eds. 1983)
(hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
31. Karl Lowenstein, Law In The Third Reich, 45 YALE L.J. 779, 784 (1936).
32. Id. at 786.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 784-86.
35. Id. at 785. The so-called Herditary Peasants Farm Law of September 29, 1933 was the
clearest example of the disastrous ramifications of adopting a so-called Gennan law. Under this
law, farms of 125 hectares (300 acres) were compulsorily converted into herditary plots. They
were exempted from the civil law of inheritance. Upon the farmer's death, the estate passed to
the eldest son or to the nearest male relative and the younger children were entitled to claim
support from the farm. The owner had no right to sell or to mortgage the farm. The farm and
its accessories could not be attached or foreclosed by creditors without the permission of the
Farm Tribunal. The Farm Tribunal also had to approve the sale or mortgage of the land. As a
result of this law, private creditors refused to extend loans to farmers who found themselves
yoked to the land. Ironically, some claimed Jewish blood in order to escape being tied to their
plots. Id. at 799.
The notion of a Germanic law was rooted in the so-called European historical school of
jurisprudence which claimed that the law should reflect the national spirit of each country. There
5
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According to Hitler, the content of this primordial Teutonic legal
tradition could only be grasped and articulated by a single, seemingly
omniscient figure-the Fuehrer (or leader) who embodied the spirit of the
volk.' According to Hitler, "[t]here is no principle which, objectively
considered, is as false as that of parliamentarianism." 37
[T]here is one thing which we must never forget: in this, too, the majority
can never replace the man. It is not only a representative of stupidity, but
of cowardice as well. And no more than a hundred empty heads make one
wise man will an heroic decision arise from a hundred cowards.'
The Nazi Party was portrayed as the vanguard for creating this new Folk
State." The first step towards the resuscitation of the German corpse was
the eradication of the non-Aryan vermin and the elimination from the body
politic of those elements responsible for Germany's defeat in World War I.
[T]here is no use in hanging petty thieves in order to let big ones go
free ... some day a German national court must judge and execute some
ten thousand of the organizing and hence responsible criminals of the
November betrayal and everything that goes with it.'
C. The Entrenchment of Nazi Power
On the day following Adolf Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor,
President Hindenburg authorized Hitler to dissolve the Reichstag and to
conduct new elections.4' On February 27, 1933, as the election campaign
reached its height, the Reichstag building was consumed by flames.42
Documents seized at Karl Liebknecht House, the headquarters of the
Communist Party, allegedly substantiated the Nazi's allegations that the fire
had been the work of the Communists. The burning of the Reichstag,
according to the Nazis, was intended to serve as a spark which would ignite
a firestorm of Marxist insurrection throughout Germany.43 The incriminat-
also was a strong reaction against that branch of normative jurisprudence which argued that the
State was limited in its powers over the individual. Instead, it was argued that the state had
unlimited sovereign power. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 475.
36. HITLER, supra note 18, at 82, 91.
37. Id. at 84.
38. Id. at 82.
39. Id. at 517.
40. Id. at 545.
41. INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 27 (1991). The
dissolution of the Reichstag enabled the Nazis to issue emergency decrees. Only five days after
coming to power Hitler's government issued the Decree for the Protection of the German People
which required political organizations to report all meetings and marches in advance and
authorized the police to forbid political meetings and demonstrations. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 27-28.
[Vol. 23
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ing documents, however, were obviously forged and were quietly with-
drawn."
On February 28, 1933, Hitler persuaded President Hindenburg to sign
a decree as a "defensive measure against Communist acts of violence
endangering the State."' Article One suspended "until further notice" the
constitutional protections against arbitrary search and seizure, abrogated the
freedoms of speech, assembly and unionization and suspended the guarantee
of due compensation for expropriated property.' Article Two authorized
the Reich government to temporarily take over the powers of any State which
failed to take the measures considered necessary to restore public security
and order.47 Criminal penalties were imposed for a failure to obey the
orders implementing the decree." The penalty for eleven offenses ranging
from treason to poisoning and arson also was increased to capital punish-
ment. 9
Following the issuance of this decree, some four thousand Communist
officials and a substantial number of Social Democratic and liberal leaders,
many of whom were members of parliament, were arrested. The Communist
and Social Democratic press and political meetings were banned and
suppressed. It was announced that only the Nazis and other allied right-wing
parties would be permitted to campaign for votes in the forthcoming March
election.'
The courts timidly fell into lockstep formation behind the Nazi Party and
broadly interpreted the concept of "Communist subversion." Judges upheld
the prohibition of church youth groups and charitable organizations as well
as meetings of opponents of vaccination.51 They reasoned that Germany
could not tolerate a marketplace of ideas. The free expression of opinion
threatened to confuse, divide and weaken the unity of the German people and
44. Id. at 28. Some allege that it was the Nazis who planned and carried out the arson.
SHIRER, supra note 2, at 268.
45. Decree, 28 February 1933, By Reich President Von Hindenburg, Cosigned By Reich
Chancellor Hitler And Reich Ministers Frick And Guertner, Suspending Constitutional Rights
And Instituting Other Measures, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 160 (1951)
[hereinafter Decree for the Protection of People and State] [hereinafter III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS]. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution permitted the issuance of Presidential
decrees to protect public order and safety. The President was authorized to suspend civil liberties
under these decrees. However, the President was required to inform parliament of any measures
which were to be taken. The Reichstag could require the revocation of any measures to which
it objected. See Extractsfromn the Weimar Constitution of 1919, in OTTO KIRCHHEIMER & FRANZ
NEUMANN, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 194-95, art. 48(2)(3) (Leena Tanner
& Keith Tribe trans. 1987).
46. Decree for the Protection of People and State, supra note 45, at 161, art. 1.
47. Id. art. 2.
48. Id. at 262, art. 4.
49. Id. art. 5.
50. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 271.
51. MULLER, supra note 41, at 47-48.
19931
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weakened their resistance to the Communist virus.52 The Munich Court of
Appeals went so far as to approve the revocation of the permit of a taxi
driver who had criticized the Ministry of Traffic. The Court reminded the
driver that Germans no longer could afford to indulge in the luxury of
criticizing their government. 3
March 5, 1933 marked the last democratic election in Germany. The
Nazis increased their vote by over five and a half million and polled over
seventeen million votes or forty-four percent of the total. Their 288
parliamentary votes, when combined with the fifty-two seats (eight percent
of the total vote) won by the right-wing Nationalist Party, gave the National
Socialist government a majority of sixteen in the Reichstag.'
Marinus van der Lubbe, a demented Dutch pyromaniac, was charged
with having set the Reichstag fire. Also arrested were Ernst Torgler, the
parliamentary leader of the Community Party, and three Bulgarian Commu-
nists-Georgi Dimitroff, Blagaoi Popov and Vassily Tanev.5 The Reichstag
trial opened on September 21, 1933 in Leipzig. The trial later was briefly
suspended and reconvened on October 10 at the scene of the fire in Berlin.'
The pre-trial investigation was subject to widespread international
criticism. The often tendentious "brown book" on the trial, which was
published by the left-wing World committee for the Relief of the Victims of
German Fascism, noted:
For five of the seven preceding months the accused had, contrary to law,
been kept in chains; the prisoners had been ... deprived of free and
impartial legal assistance; they had been dragged through the confusion ofmany lengthy interrogations; their legitimate requests bad been refused by
thepolice athe he Examining Magistrate; they had been obstructed and
hindered in the preparation of their defence at every turn; now, faced with
a hundred and more witnesses, with a hostile Court and with all the force
and enmity of a Fascist regime, they came to their trial.57
Nevertheless, after reviewing the skeletal evidentiary record, the Court
reluctantly acquitted four of the five defendants.58 The mentally muddled
van der Lubbe was the only defendant convicted and he was later behead-
ed.-' Although there was no evidence linking van der Lubbe to a conspira-
cy to foment a Communist insurrection, he was convicted and executed
52. Id. at 48.
53. Id. at 49.
54. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 273.
55. Id. at 269-70.
56. MULLER, supra note 41, at 31.
57. WORLD COMMITrEE FOR THE RELIEF OF THE VICTIMS OF GERMAN FASCISM, THE
REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL THE SECOND BROWN BOOK OF THE HITLER TERROR 74 (1934)
[hereinafter BROWN BOOK].
58. Id. at 249.
59. ld. at 250-53.
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pursuant to a law which retroactively imposed the death penalty for
treason. 60
The Nazi Party newspaper characterized the acquittals as a miscarriage
of justice. Hitler proclaimed that the tribunal's judgment was "'laugh-
able.'" 61 Hermann Goering added that the trial demonstrated that it was
"'impossible to adhere to abstract paragraphs when an infamous political
crime is to be adjudged, such a course leads to an impossible position."'6 2
The Nazis vowed that they no longer would be constrained by the fetters of
bourgeois law and rapidly moved to reconstitute the legal system. Goering
brazenly boasted that the Nazis would "not be crippled by any judicial
thinking. . . I don't have to worry about justice, my mission is only to
destroy and exterminate, nothing more!"'
Hitler's next step was to free himself from the limitations imposed by the
Weimar constitution. On March 24, 1933, Hitler introduced, and the
Reichstag passed, the Law for the Solution of the Emergency of People and
Reich or the "enabling act" which constituted the major pillar of Nazi
rule." Article One abrogated the separation of powers and authorized the
executive to promulgate decrees without parliamentary consultation.'
Article Two permitted the government to "deviate" from the requirements
of the constitution.' Article Four authorized the executive to enter into
treaties without legislative approval.67 In introducing the legislation, Hitler
challenged the parliament: "[mlay you now, my honourable deputies, make
your own decision-peace or war!"68 Only the Social Democrats defied the
loud and angry throng of brown-shirts gathered outside the Reichstag. Otto
Wells, leader of the Social Democrats, a dozen of whose deputies had been
detained, protested that "[no enabling act can give you [the Nationals
Socialists] the power to destroy ideas which are eternal and indestructi-
ble."' Wells was unable to persuade other parties to oppose the measure
60. Id. at 270-71.
61. MULLER, supra note 41, at 34.
62. BROWN BOOK, supra note 57, at 243.
63. BULLOCK, supra note 9, at 264.
64. The "Enabling Act," reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 163.
The "enabling act" was based on article 76 of the Weimar Constitution which permitted
constitutional change with the assent of two thirds of the quorum of Reichstag deputies. A
quorum was comprised of two thirds of the total number of Reichstag deputies. H.W. KOCH,
IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK POLTICAL JUSTICE IN HITLER'S GERMANY 35 (1989). The
Reichstag renewed the act every four years. "It met only a dozen times up to the war, 'enacted'
only four laws, held no debates or votes and never heard any speeches except those made by
Hitler." SHIRER, supra note 2, at 378.
65. The "Enabling Act," supra note 64, at 163, art. 1.
66. Id. at 163-66, art. 2.
67. Id. at 164, art. 4.
68. KOCH, supra note 64, at 36.
69. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 277.
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and the final vote was 441 in favor of the measure and 84 (all Social
Democrats) opposed to the measure.'
Hitler now was free of the Weimar Constitution. Parliamentary
democracy had been abandoned.71 The "'Enabling Act'" vested Hitler with
the power to promulgate decrees without having to gain either presidential
or parliamentary approval.' English historian Allan Bullock writes that the
"street gangs had seized control of the resources of a great modern State, the
gutter had come to power.'
Hitler next took steps to further handicap his political opponents. The
July 14, 1933, Law Against A New Formation of Parties, stated that the
"only political party in existence is the National Socialist German Workers'
Party (N S D A P)."74 Section Two provided that the maintenance or
formation of another political party will be punished with up to three years
imprisonment.75
On October 14, 1933, President Hindenburg signed a decree dissolving
the Reichstag and ordering new elections. Of course, only the National
Socialist Party was legally authorized to contest the election and to appear on
the ballot.76
The Law for the Safeguarding of Unity of Party and State, decreed on
December 1, 1933, proclaimed that the National Socialist German Workers'
Party is the bearer of the German State ideology" and is "merged with the
State inseparably."' In order to guarantee the "closest cooperation"
between the party and public authorities, the Fuehrer's party deputy and the
chief of staff of the Nazi militia were named as members of the Reich
cabinet.78 The decree recognized that the members of the Nazi Party and
militia possessed "an enhanced duty toward the Fuehrer, the Nation, and the
State" and, as a result, they were made subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
70. Id. at 277-78.
71. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying texts.
72. Article 48 of the Constitution permitted President Hindenburg to issue emergency decrees.
The "'enabling act'" permitted Hitler to issue decrees without Hindenburg's endorsement or
support. See BULLOCK, supra note 9, at 270. The cabinet also cased to function under Hitler.
The previous practice had been to permit the ministers to adopt measures by a majority vote.
Friedrich Roetter, The Impact Of Nazi Law, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 516, 525 (1945).
73. BULLOCK, supra note 9, at 270.
74. Law against the new formation of parties, of July 14, 1933, reprinted in Roetter, supra
note 72, at 560.
75. Id. At the same time, Hitler issued the Law concerning Referendum of July 14, 1933. Id.
The act permitted the Reich government to conduct referendums on its policies. It was not stated
whether a negative vote could prevent a measure from coming into force. Id.
76. Id. at 526.
77. Law of 1 December 1933 Concerning Special Nazi Party And Storm Troops' (SA)
Jurisdiction Over Members Of The Nazi Party, The SA, And Their Subordinate Organizations,
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 166, art. 1(1) [hereinafter Law
for the Safeguarding of Unity of Party and State].
78. Id. art. 2.
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of special party courts.' This effectively immunized party members from
legal accountability.'
Hitler took two final steps to consolidate his power. On January 30,
1934, the first anniversary of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, the
Reichstag passed the Law About The Reconstruction Of The Reich.81
The law dissolved the national assemblies of the federated states' and
the state governments were amalgamated into the Reich.83 On August 1,
1934, the Reich government ratified the Law About The Head Of The State
Of The German Reich. This decree provided that at the time of death of
Reich President Hindenburg that the office of Reich president was to be
"merged" with that of Reich chancellor.' The next day, President Hinden-
burg passed away. Adolf Hitler now assumed the added powers of head of
state and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The title of president
was abolished and Hitler was proclaimed as Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.
The single threat to Hitler's centralization of power was eliminated when the
military willingly swore an oath of unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler
as the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander. 5 On August 19, 1933, ninety-
five percent of the registered voters went to the polls and thirty-eight million,
or ninety percent, approved Hitler's usurpation of power. Only four and a
quarter million Germans voted "'No.'" 1
The foundation for the Third Reich now had been firmly established.
On September 4, 1934, the Nazi Party Congress assembled in Nuremberg.
Thirty thousand listened as Gauleiter Adolf Wanger of Bavaria read the
Fuehrer's proclamation:
The German form of life is definitely determined for the next
thousand years. The Age of Nerves of the nineteenth century has found
its close with us. There will be no other revolution in Germany for the
next one thousand years! 7
Hitler's contempt for democratic procedures and his consolidation of
power should not have been surprising. In 1930, he had proclaimed that the
National Socialists had never
79. Id. art. 3.
80. See DONALD M. MCKALE, THE NAZI PARTY COURTS HITLER'S MANAGEMENT OF
CONFLICT IN His MOVEMENT, 192 1-1945 (1974).
81. Law about the Reconstruction of the Reich of January 30, 1934, reprinted in Roetter,
supra note 72, at 561, app.
82. Id. at 562, art. 1.
83. Id. art. 2. The administration of Justice was centralized in the Reich. See Extracts From
The Second Law Concerning The Transfer Of The Administration Of Justice To The Reich, 5
December 1934, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 172.
84. Roetter, supra note 72, at 526.
85. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 314.
86. Id. at 318.
87. Id. at 318-19.
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"'asserted ourselves representatives of the democratic point of view, but
have openly declared that we take recourse to democratic means only to
win power and that after our seizure of power we shall decline without any
hesitation to afford to our opponents all those means which were put at our
disposal in times of opposition."
D. The Naztfication Of The Judiciary
The Nazis immediately launched a concerted campaign to limit the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary. They quickly dismissed and
demoted politically unreliable judges and officials of the Ministry of
Justice.'
Hitler had little regard for the legal profession. He was particularly
horrified after reading of a building technician who had killed his wife and
who had been convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to five years hard
labor. Hitler criticized the legal curriculum as "'one great systematic denial
of responsibility.'"' He vowed to make the study of law "dispised" and to
terminate ninety percent of those involved in the administration of justice.9'
The Fuehrer's radical aspirations were articulated in a memo written by
Curt Rothenberger, an Under Secretary in Ministry of Justice.'
The present crisis in the administration of justice today is close to ... a
climax. A totally new conception of the administration of justice must be
created, particularly a National Socialist judiciary, and for this the
druggist's salve is not sufficient; only the knife of the surgeon, as will later
be shown, can bring about the solution.93
The criterion . . . for the functions of justice and particularly of the judge
in the National Socialist Reich must be a justice which meets the demands
of national socialism.'
88. Quoted in KOCH, supra note 64, at 34.
89. The twenty year training period for the judiciary tended to limit access to the judiciary to
the upper-middle and upper classes. The judiciary, although accessible to Jews, generally was
nationalistic, conservative and anti-semitic. MULLER, supra note 41, at 6-7, 12-13, 18-19.
There was a significant amount of continuity between those at the top-echelon of the Weimar
and National Socialist legal system. KOCH, supra note 64, at 17-18. The "judiciary, criticized
from all sides, largely politically apathetic, economically underprivileged, was bound to put its
hopes, however cautiously, in a new party and a new regime." Id. at 18.
90. KOCH, supra note 64, at 112.
91. Id.
92. Report From Defendant Rothenberger To Defendant Schlegelberger, II May 1942, Noting
Rothenberger's Intention To Intensify "'The Internal Direction And Steering Of The Administra-
tion Of Justice,'" And Enclosing Copies Of Rothenberger's Instructions To Judges In His
District, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 483.
93. Correspondence Between The Reich Chancellery And Hitler's Adjutant, May And June
1942, Mentioning That Hitler Had Considered "Noteworthy" The Rothenberger Memorandum
On Judicial Reform, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 467, 469.
94. Id. at 472.
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He who is striding gigantically toward a new world order cannot move in
the limitation of an orderly administration of justice. To accomplish such
a far-reaching revolution ... is only possible if... all outmoded
institutions, concepts, and habits have been done away with-if need be in
a brutal manner... [aIll clamor about lawlessness, despotism, injustice,
etc., is at present nothing but a lack of insight into the political situa-
tion."
The Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April
1933 provided that officials, including judges, who were of non-Aryan
descent were to be retired.96 Those officials, who because of their
previous political activity, did not offer the security that they would act at all
times and without reservation in the interests of the national state also were
to be dismissed from the civil service.' Officials also could be freely
transferred to another office in the same or equivalent career, even to one
carrying a lower rank or salary."
Six hundred and forty-three Jewish judges were terminated in Prussia
alone. The small number of politically progressive members of the judiciary
also were dismissed. Among the 122 judges sitting on the various panels of
the Supreme Court, only one, Hermann Grossman was a Social Democrat.
In April 1933, Grossman was dismissed on the grounds that he was
politically unreliable.'
The other judges remained silent and supine as their colleagues were
terminated. In the spring of 1933, the state and national German Federation
of Judges agreed to permit themselves to be absorbed into the Federation of
National Socialist Jurists and acknowledged the leadership of Chancellor
Adolf Hitler. The German Federation of Judges now proclaimed that its
"main task" was "'the cooperation of all judges in the revision of German
law... Free of all shackles... judges must remain beyond the reach of the
spirit of trade unionism and narrow professionalism.'" 1" Writing in the
federation's publication, Supreme Court judge Erich Schultze endorsed the
notion that there should be severe penalties imposed on those Aryans who
betrayed Germany by having children with a member of inferior races. The
clearest demonstration of Hitler's support among jurists occurred in Leipzig
95. Id.
96. Law For The Restoration Of The Professional Civil Service Of 7 April 1933, reprinted in
DOCUMETS supra note 30, at 223-24, sec. III, para. 1. On April 1933 non-Aryan was defined
to include persons with only one non-Aryan grandparent; and on June 30, this provision was
extended to those married to non-Aryans. Id. at 224 n.8. Non-Aryan officials were not forced
to retire if had been in the military service as of August 1, 1914; if they had fought at the front
during World War I; or if their fathers or sons had been killed in World War I. Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933, Id. sec. III, pam. 2.
97. Id. see. IV. A supplementary law of July 20, 1933 provided that civil servants who
belonged to any party or organization which furthered the aims of Communism, Marxism or the
Social Democrats were to be dismissed. Id. n.9.
98. Id. sec. V, art. 1.
99. MULLER, supra note 41, at 37.
100. Id. at 38.
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in October 1933. Ten thousand lawyers gathered in front of the Supreme
Court building and swore, with their right arms raised in the Nazi salute,
"'by the soul of the German people'" that they would "'strive as German
jurists to follow the course of our Fiiehrer to the end of our days.' 10 1 The
judges also pledged to be "'loyal and obedient to the Fuehrer ... Adolf
Hitler, to adhere to the law, and to fulfill the duties of my office conscien-
tiously so help me God.'""
The purge of Jewish and politically progressive judges did not insure the
complete subordination of the judiciary to the Nazi Party. Some continued
to cling to the notion of judicial independence." ° In April 1942, Hitler
claimed the right to intervene to correct judicial decisions and to remove
judges who did not "understand the demand of the hour." "
Furthermore, I expect the German legal profession to understand that
the nation is not here for them but that they are here for the nation, that is,
the world which includes Germany must not decline in order that formal
law may live, but Germany must live irrespective of the contradictions of
formal justice."
The Reichstag endorsed Hitler's power to intervene into the judicial process
and proclaimed that Adolf Hitler was the supreme law lord as well the
supreme political and military leader. In the Unanimous Decision Of The
Greater German Reichstag, Concerning Unrestricted Powers of Adolf Hitler,
the Nazi parliament recognized that the Fuehrer possessed the power to
impose punishment on offenders and to remove them from office.
'[W]ithout being bound by existing legal regulations-the Fuehrer. . .must
be in a position to force with all means at his disposal every German, if
necessary, whether he be common soldier or officer, low or high official
or judge, leading or subordinate official of the Party, worker or employee,
to fulfill his duties. In case of violations of these duties the Fuehrer is
entitled, after conscientious examination, regardless of so-called well
101. Id. at 38. Most judges joined the Nazi Party. Those who were not members were
expected to belong to the Reich Federation of German Officials and to the Nazi Rechstwahrer
Federation which were affiliated with the National Socialists. Roetter, supra note 72, at 538.
102. Roetter, supra note 72, at 535. Judges generally were appointed on the recommendations
of the Gauleiters (local party leaders) to the Ministry of Justice while those who held important
and visible judicial positions were appointed by Hitler. KOCH, supra note 64, at 84.
103. See Report From The President Of The Court Of Appeal In Hamm, 7 July 1942,
Concerning The Alarm Among Judges Caused By Hitler's Reichstag Speech of 26 April 1942,
And Certain Activities Of The Gestapo And The Nazi Party Affecting Legal Matters, reprinted
in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 448.
104. Extract From Hitler's Speech To The German Reichstag, 26 April 1942, Requesting
Confirmation Of The Right To Keep Everyone At His Duty And Expressing His Intention To
Intervene Where Judges "Do Not Understand The Demand Of The Hour," reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 436, 438 (emphasis omitted).
105. Id. at 437 (emphasis omitted).
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established rights, to impose due punishment, and to remove the offender
from his post, rank and position, without using prescribed procedures. '
In August 1942 Hitler issued a decree which gave the new Reich
Minister of Justice broad powers to bring the administration of justice into
conformity with Nazi ideology:
'A strong administration of justice is necessary for the fulfillment of
the tasks of the Greater German Reich. Therefore, I commission and
empower the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a National Socialist
Administration of Justice, and to take all necessary measures in accordance
with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader
of the Party Chancellery. He can hereby deviate from any existing
law. ' 17
Judges, like other Germans, were expected to adhere to the Fuehrer-
prinzip or leadership principle.108 Hermann Goering pronounced that "'the
law and the will of the Fuehrer are one.'"" Carl Schmitt, perhaps the
leading constitutional jurist in the Third Reich, pronounced that "'[liaw is no
longer an objective norm but a spontaneous emanation of the Filehrer's
will.'"' n Judges were envisioned as the Fuehrer's vicar who were required
to rule as the Fuehrer would in a given situation."1 The judiciary was to
follow rather than restrain the Fuehrer. Cases were to be decided in
accordance with Nazi ideology, intuition and the spirit of the "volk" rather
than on the basis of evidence or formal rationality.1 2 Judges were admon-
ished to avoid permitting the "details" of litigation to distract them from
reaching the appropriate decision." 3
Prosecutors typically met with judges prior to trial in order to instruct
them as to the expected disposition of the case. The President of the Berlin
106. Unanimous Decision Of The Greater German Reichstag, 26 April 1942, Concerning
Unrestricted Powers Of Adolf Hitler, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
45, at 204-05.
Hitler's position as supreme law lord provided him with unrestrained power. When Nazi
storm troopers were accused of having ruthlessly murdered innocents during the so-called
Roehm-Putsch, Hitler convened the Reichstag and proclaimed:
'If we are reproached for not for not leaving matters to be dealt with by the ordinary
courts, I can only say this: in that hour I was responsible for the fate of the German
nation, and thus I was the Supreme Law Lord of the German people.'
Roetter, supra note 72, at 532.
On July 3, 1934, Hitler issued a decree legalizing this infamous blood-purge of June 30,
1934. Lowenstein, supra note 31, at 811.
107. Quoted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 51.
108. KOCH, supra note 64, at 38.
109. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 370.
110. Quoted in Lowenstein, supra note 41, at 811.
111. See KOCH, supra note 64, at 39.
112. See id. at 73. See also "the spirit of the Volk" MULLER, supra note 41, at 72-73.
113. Roetter, supra note 72, at 538.
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Court of Appeal wrote Justice Minister Schlegelberger in 1942 complaining
that these meetings were undermining trust in the judiciary and suggested that
they should be conducted with greater circumspection one day prior to
trial. 11
4
A series of "Judges' Letters" were circulated among the judiciary which
criticized erroneous decisions and praised those which were viewed as
enlightened." 5 Justice Minister Otto Thierack reminded the judges that
their role was like that of a physician: "he gives aid to the compatriot who
asks him for help and thus prevents damage to the community. The judge
like a physician, must be able to eliminate the seat of a disease or perform
operations like a surgeon.""'
In an autumn 1940 case, it had been announced that a special coffee
ration would be distributed to the population of a local town. Local Jews
registered for the distribution, but it later was proclaimed that they were not
eligible to receive the coffee. Five hundred Jews were then fined for
violating the ration regulations. A local judge ruled that the statute of
limitations had tolled and concluded that the Jews had been improperly
fined. 1 7 He characterized the fines as "'untenable,'" "'fabricated,'" and
"'abstruse.'"" 8 Minister Thierack attacked the court's opinion as contributing
to the "pilloring [of] a German administrative authority by the Jews."" 9
He noted that the judge should have avoided "harming the prestige of the
food office and ...putting the Jew expressly in the right.""°
Thierack also was critical of a two year sentence which had been handed
out to a German Jew who had been arrested in Holland in 1941 for a
currency violation.'
The court applies the same criteria for imposing punishment as it
would if it were dealing with a German fellow citizen as defendant. This
cannot be sanctioned. The Jew is the enemy of the German people, who
has plotted, stirred up, and prolonged this war. In so doing, he has
brought unspeakable misery upon our people. Not only is he of different
but of inferior race. Justice, which must not measure different matters by
114. Letter From The President Of The Berlin Court Of Appeal To Defendant Schlegelberger,
3 January 1942, Commenting Upon "Influence Exerted Upon The Judges," reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 433, 435-36.
115. See Circular Letter From Thierack To Judges, 7 September 1942, Explaining The
Establishment And Function Of The Judges' Letters, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 523.
116. Id. at 524.
117. The First Issue Of The Judges' Letters, 1 October 1942, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 525, 530.
118. Id. at 532.
119. Id. at 531.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 532-34.
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the same standard, demands that just this racial aspect must be considered
in the meting out of punishment.2
In a third case, Justice Minister Thierack criticized a local court's
handing out a modest fine of thirty Reichmarks or ten days in prison to a
Jewish proprietress of a boarding house who had failed to add the required
surname "Sara" to her listing in the phone book."z Thierack observed that
the defendant had engaged in a "typically Jewish camouflage in her business
dealings."" u Earlier, various judges had been attacked for the lenient
treatment they had meted out to Polish defendants. The judges were
admonished that the Poles constituted a "serious danger" and should receive
the "heaviest sentences."'25
As late as 1942, the Security Police sent a secret report to Hitler which
argued that additional "political and ideological adjustment of the judiciary"
was required in order to insure that their decisions fully complied with
principles of National Socialism." The Justice Ministry feared that the
Security Police was attempting to assert administrative control over the
judicial bureaucracy and assured Hitler on various occasions that it was
adequately controlling, monitoring and correcting sentences. 127  The
Fuehrer, however, harbored continuing suspicions concerning the competen-
cy of judges and regularly found it necessary to intervene to correct
sentences. In 1941, the Fuehrer read of Makus Luftgus, a seventy-four year
old Jew, who had been sentenced to two and one-half years in prison for
having purportedly hoarded sixty-five thousand eggs. Hitler complained to
the Justice Ministry which promptly turned Luftgus over the Gestapo for
122. Id. at 533.
123. Id. at 534.
124. Id. at 535.
125. Circular Letter From Defendant Schlegelberger To The Presidents Of The Courts Of
Appeal And Attorneys General, 24 July 1941, Entitled "Mild Sentences Against Poles,"
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 628-29.
126. Secret Report Of The Chief Of The Security Police And SD, 3 September 1942,
Concerning "The Control Of Penal Jurisdiction" and The Reactions Of Judges Thereto, reprinted
in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 454, 456-57. The report recognized that
the coordination of judicial decisions was inherently difficult given the diversity of fact situations
which confronted the judiciary. It pointed to one case in which the Fuehrer criticized a criminal
sentence handed out to a mother whose child was fatally scalded after falling into a tub of hot
water. The Fuehrer believed that the loss of a child was sufficient punishment. The judiciary,
according to the report, erroneously interpreted the Fuehrer's objection as being based on the
principle that women should be mildly punished. As a result, in a subsequent case, a women
who attempted to bribe a judge was mistakenly punished with a mild sentence. Id. at 459.
127. See Four Communications, May-June 1942, Concerning The Authority For The
Confirmation Of Sentences, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 438.
The Justice Ministry had an ambitious plan for simplifying the hierarchy of German courts,
drastically reducing the number of judges and implementing an intense educational and training
program. However, the plan was never implemented. Id. at 52.
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execution.12 In another instance, Hitler protested a sentence of ten years
hard labor and the loss of civil rights which had been handed out to a Anton
Scharff, a young, impoverished nineteen year old. Scharff had snatched a
handbag from a young women as she attempted to open her front door during
an air raid blackout. Hitler again insisted on capital punishment "considering
the heroic fighting of our soldiers.""' Those judges whose sentences were
corrected invariably were replaced' 30 or were expelled from the National
Socialist Party.131
In other cases, party officials intervened to frustrate prosecutions. In
1933, a group of Storm Troopers engaged in a series of vicious assaults and
attacks against a group of political prisoners who had been confined in a
German concentration camp. The guards were reprimanded and subjected
to minor disciplinary measures. Party officials, however, were able to
persuade the Justice Ministry to abandon plans to subject the guards to
criminal prosecution. It was pointed out that the guards had lacked experi-
ence in controlling Communist inmates, most of whom displayed an
insubordinate and insolent attitude. 32 Circulars also were issued advising
that no prosecutions should be initiated against German civilians who had
lynched Allied pilots 133 or who had committed atrocities against Poles,
Jews and other "'undesirable elements during the Polish campaign. '""
E. The Nazification Of The Legal Profession
Hitler had low-regard for the legal profession. Ingo Muller writes:
He detested lawyers as pen-pushers who filled whole volumes with tangled
commands and prohibitions and always had their noses buried in ridiculous
tomes. He once confided to a gathering of confidants that going to law
school must turn every rational person into 'a complete idiot,' and that for
128. Correspondence Between Lammers, Schaub, And Defendant Schlegelberger, October
1941, Concerning Transfer Of Markus Luftgus To The Gestapo For Execution, reprinted in Ill
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 429, 430-31.
129. Correspondence Between Bormann, Lammers, And Defendant Schlegelberger, 25, 29 May
and 28 June 1941, Concerning A Suggestion Of Hitler To Convert A Prison Sentence Into A
Death Sentence, reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 425.
130. See Two Orders Signed By Defendant Schlegelberger For The Initiation Of Criminal
Proceedings Against Notaries Because Of Their Attitude Toward The National Socialist State,
19 May 1938 And 6 December 1938 reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
45, at 363-65.
131. See Letters From Guertner, Reich Minister Of Justice To Hitler's Deputy Rudolf Hess
And To The SA Chief Of Staff, Viktor Lutze, 5 June 1935, Concerning Interference In The
Trial Of Camp Hohenstein Personnel reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
45, at 352-56.
132. Id. at 47.
133. See Secret Circular From Martin Bornann To Nazi Party Leaders, 30 May 1944,
Concerning "People's Justice Against Anglo-American Murderers" reprinted in III TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 577.
134. Id. at 55.
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his part he would 'do everything he could. . . to make people despise a
legal education.""
The German legal profession numbered some fifteen thousand at the time
of the Nazi ascendancy in 1933. Their training consisted of a three or four
year program which prepared them for a national examination. After passing
the examination, they entered into a lengthy apprenticeship program. At this
point, they were eligible for the great state Assessor Examination. Those
who passed were admitted to practice."
In 1928, the Nazi Party established an affiliate organization of lawyers
initially known as the National Socialist German Jurists' League (BNSDJ),
which was headed by Hans Frank.137 In 1931, the membership of the Nazi
organization only numbered roughly six hundred or less than one percent of
all German jurists. However, by May 1933, all of the traditional
associations of lawyers had been dissolved and absorbed into the BNSDJ. 135
Lawyers rushed to join the new organization which by 1934 boasted a
membership of 80,000 and claimed to be the largest organization of jurists
in the world. 3 9 All lawyers, even those who were not party members,
were later required to belong to the organization of Nazi jurists. Lawyers
also were compelled to belong to the Reich Chamber of Attorneys which
organized the country's attorneys into a myriad of connected cells, each of
which was supervised by a block leader. Attorneys who were party members
were brought before party courts for breaches of discipline while attorneys
who were not party members were brought before so-called Courts of
Honor. 1'
An April 1933 decree prohibited the practice of law by those of non-
Aryan descent' as well as by those who had engaged in Communist
activities.' 42 In Prussia, in 1933 there were a total of 18,038 lawyers and
135. MULLER, supra note 41, at 295.
136. III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 95-96.
137. Id. at 96-97. The organization's name later was changed to the Nationalsozialistischer
Rechtswahrebund (NSRB), or the National Socialist Organization of Those Who Maintain And
Preserve The Law. Id. at 97.
138. Id. at 97.
139. Id. Many lawyers welcomed the purging of their Jewish competitors. The Nazis claimed
that Jews, who numbered roughly one percent of the total Reich population, comprised as much
as 17.5 percent of the lawyers in Prussia. Nazi policies also led to a brisk business in such areas
as restructuring corporations to protect Jewish interests during the Aryanization program.
MICHAEL H. KATER, THE NAZI PARTY A SOCIAL PROFILE OF MEMBERS AND LEADERS 1919-
1945, 113 (1983). In the end, the dislocation of the war severely limited lawyers' practice and
income. Id. at I11.
140. Roetter, supra note 72, at 542.
141. Law, 7 April 1933, Concerning Admission To The Bar, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 164-65, arts. 1, 4.
142. Id. at 165, arts. 3, 4. The law exempted those admitted to the bar prior to August 1, 1933
or who during World War I had fought for the German Reich or her allies, or whose fathers or
sons had been killed in action during World War 1. Id. art. 1. On the basis of this law, 1,500
attorneys were deprived of their right to license. However, roughly 2,900 Jewish attorneys were
1993]
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notaries (attorneys who prepared documents). By 1935, their ranks had been
pruned to a total of 5,424.43 Ingo Muller writes:
Justice as an ideal disappeared from Germany with the "elimina-
tion" . . . of the Jewish, socialist and democratic members of the legal
profession, who made up one fifth of the total number and were the group
at which Hitler's attacks were chiefly aimed. What remained was a
mutilated and perverted sense ofjustice, characterized . .. by glorification
of power, brutalization of the climate of opinion, and in-
humanity ... which shared Hitler's aversion to "legal-mindedness."'"
National Socialism proclaimed that the lawyer's primary duty no longer
was to their client. The interests of the client were to be considered only so
far as they did not conflict with fealty to Adolf Hitler. Attorneys swore "to
remain loyal to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler,
and to fulfill conscientiously the duties of a German attorney, so help me
God."' 45 The journal of the Ministry of Justice exhorted lawyers to
"'march as an army corps of the Fuehrer." ' 1" Attorneys who failed to
demonstrate adherence to the principles of National Socialism found their
careers stymied. For instance, the Ministry of Justice circulated a memo that
in defending certain political criminals, "[o]nly such attorneys can be
considered whose attitudes prove beyond doubt that they fully approve of the
political plans of the State and of the ideological aims of the movement."' 47
Lawyers, like their judicial counterparts, received hortatory letters which
still permitted to practice under this exemption. Local bar associations implemented local rules
which prevented these remaining Jewish lawyers from serving as advocates. For instance, the
Bar Association of Berlin declared that establishing or maintaining a law firm with partners of
both "Aryan" and "non-Aryan" descent was unethical. The Bar Association of Dusseldorf
decreed that it was a violation of professional standards for anyone to take over the practice of
an attorney whose bar membership had been revoked, to employ former "non-Aryan" attorneys,
or to take over their clients. MULLER, supra note 41, at 61. The Law on German Citizenship
of September 27, 1938, revoked the right to practice of all remaining "non-Aryan" attorneys and
demoted them to the rank of "Jewish legal advisers." These advisers were permitted to act in
an extremely limited fashion on behalf of Jewish clients. A number of additional decrees were
passed which prevented Jews from having any role whatsoever in the practice of law. For
instance, it was declared illegal to employ disbarred Jewish attorneys in subordinate positions
such as office manager or legal assistance. Id. at 62.
143. KOCH, supra note 64, at 43. Jews in Germany had limited access to employment. They
constituted 0.16 percent of all government employees. Roughly 250 ministers served in the
twenty different post-war German cabinets in the Weimar era. Six were Jewish, only two of
whom actively practiced their faith. Largely excluded from the civil service, they gravitated to
law, medicine and the arts. There were roughly 19,500 members of the bar in Germany, roughly
4,394 were Jewish. In Berlin, sixty percent of the legal profession were Jewish and in Vienna,
perhaps eight percent of attorneys in private practice were Jewish. They tended to be among the
most liberal elements in the German legal system. MULLER, supra note 41, at 59-60.
144. MULLER, supra note 41, at 296.
145. Roetter, supra note 72, at 542.
146. III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 98.
147. Circular Letter From Defendant Schlegelberger To Presidents Of District Courts Of
Appeal, 31 January 1938, Requesting Lists Of Attorneys Allowed To Defend Prisoners Held In
Protective Custody, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 321-22. See
also Roetter, supra note 72, at 544.
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instructed them concerning the appropriate attitude and behavior. Justice
Minister Thierack reminded attorneys that Germany was waging war on its
enemies both at home and abroad and that the legal profession was on the
front lines of this domestic war. 4 ' A trial no longer was to involve a
confrontation between prosecutors and defense attorneys. The defense
attorney's role had changed. Their primary responsibility was to align
themselves with the state in eliminating those who posed a threat to the social
order. Attorneys were to assist in the process of determining whether a
defendant was guilty of the offense with which they were charged. The
question, however, was not merely whether the defendant was guilty, but
whether he or she were loyal and devoted members of the Reich. Thierack
admonished that "[w]hoever is not ready to accept this . . . ought not to don
the robe of a German lawyer nor take a place at the defense counsel's
bench." 49
Thus, there was to be a "'unanimity of aim"' between judges, prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys. It was not unusual for defense attorneys to
denounce their clients before the court and to demand that they be pun-
ished.' " Those that represented their defendants with enthusiasm or
conviction at times were disbarred for activity "'in a Communist
sense.'"'5 Any act which was perceived as demonstrating a lack of loyalty
to Hitler was deemed to be a violation of the attorney's oath and was
considered to constitute a ground for disbarment.'52 In one case, an
attorney who voted "No" in the referendum on the annexation of Austria was
disbarred by the Court of Honor for having breached his duty of loyalty to
the Fuehrer. Another attorney was disbarred for having continued to consult
a Jewish physician who had saved her life.' 53
A third lawyer attempted to demonstrate a Czech defendant's pro-
German attitude by reading portions of a speech written by the defendant.
The attorney interrupted his discourse and noted that "'I could almost believe
I hear my Fuehrer speak.'"'" Justice Minister Thierack attacked the
lawyer's lack of prudence:
To mention a speech by one of the Czech defendants in one breath with a
speech by the Fuehrer was-no matter how it was meant-outrageous.
Such a thing cannot be excused an 'awkward mistake.' Lack of instinct is
a feature of one's character.' 55
148. Extracts From Lawyers' Letter No. I Signed By Reich Minister Of Justice Thierack, I
October 1944 reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 554-55.
149. Id. at 561.
150. MULLER, supra note 41, at 64.
151. Id. at 65.
152. Id. at 65-66.
153. Id. at 66.
154. Extracts From Lawyers' Letter No. 1 Signed By Reich Minister Of Justice Thierack, I
October 1944, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 554, 558.
155. Id. at 566.
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Another attorney was brought before the Court of Honor for offering to
defend a Catholic friend's young son who had been arrested on suspicion of
having participated in a demonstration against the Hitler youth. The attorney
was ordered by the local party sub-leader to drop his defense and was
prosecuted for having betrayed his obligation to eliminate and oppose
"political Catholicism." He was acquitted after persuading the tribunal that
his purpose was to gain the young man's confidence, discover the others
involved and then betray his privileged relationship and turn the names over
to the Gestapo."
Law faculty and students also were subjected to scrutiny. On April 7,
1933, all Jewish and political progressive instructors were expelled from law
school faculties. As a result, 120 out of the 378 scholars holding academic
positions were dismissed. The Nazi government took control of the
appointment process and filled the vacant posts with young National Socialist
faculty. Most continued to teach until the late 1960s (by 1939, fully two
thirds of the faculty at German law schools had been appointed in or after
1933). 117 In certain specialties, such as international law, over one-half of
faculty were expelled. 5' American James Wilford Garner, writing in
1933, observed:
The result of the Nazi "purge" has been. . . to denude the German
universities of the great majority of the professors of international law,
"Aryans" and "non-Aryans" alike, whose reputations extended beyond the
frontiers of Germany. Of those who have been undisturbed, only a few are
known even by reputation to American international lawyers .... The
vacancies created by the removals have been filled for the most part (if at
all) by men without distinguished reputations and who are largely unknown
outside Germany, but whose loyalty to Naziism is at least publicly
professed. '59
This new breed had no interest in disinterested and objective scholarship.
Carl Schmitt, the darling of Nazi legal intellectuals, wrote that "'[t]he whole
of German law today . . . must be governed solely and exclusively by the
spirit of National Socialism . . . Every interpretation must be an interpreta-
tion according to National Socialism." ' Wilhelm Sauer, who had been
appointed to a professorship in 1919, exhorted his fellow academics in 1933
"'to extol the Fiehrer as a figure of light and a hero who is leading the
German soul out of the depths into the light, showing it the safe path to
156. Roetter, supra note 72, at 543.
157. MULLER, supra note 41, at 69. Law faculty under the National-Socialists were appointed
by the government. See Max Rheinstein, Law Faculties And Law Schools. A Comparison Of
Legal Education In The United States And Germany, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 5, 12 n. 19 (1938).
158. James W. Garner, The Nazi Proscription Of German Professors Of Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L
L. 112, 113-14 (1939); see also Detlev F. Vagts, International Law In The Third Reich, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 661 (1990).
159. Garner, supra note 158, at 118.
160. MULLER, supra note 41, at 70.
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Valhalla. . . .'"" Fredrich Schaffstein, in his inaugural professorial
lecture in January 1934, reminded his colleagues that "'[a]lmost all the
principles, concepts, and distinctions of our law up to now are stamped with
the spirit of the Enlightenment, and they therefore require reshaping on the
basis of anew kind of thought and experience.'
162
The National Socialists made two major modifications in the process
leading to legal certification. First, physical and ideological training was
introduced into the curriculum. As prerequisite to admission to law school,
the candidate was required to demonstrate that they had spent time in the
Reich labor service." Once admitted, students were required to serve in
the student cadres of the Storm Troopers and the SS Elite Guards."
Students also were exposed to a heavy dose of ideological education. The
legal curriculum was required to involve "a serious occupation with National-
Socialism and its ideological fundaments, with the idea of the ties between
blood and soil, and between race and culture, with German community life,
and with the great men of the German people."" c This training continued
throughout the candidates' legal clerkships and some were required to attend
special indoctrination camps prior to being given permission to take the final
state legal examination." At the end of their studies, students were
required to pass a character as well as a substantive examination. They were
expected to have a knowledge of the Nazi Party program, history and of
Hitler's accomplishments, background and thought.'67 Prior to being
admitted to practice in Prussia, a candidates had to display his "'conscious-
ness of being a member of the national community, his social understanding,
and . . . [that] the entire race development of the German people in the
present and future constitute the basis of his personality. . . ."' " Hitler
commemorated national holidays by annulling the test results of those who
had passed the character examination, but who had failed the substantive
portion. 169
In addition to this physical and ideological training, the Nazis added an
additional probationary period onto the requirements for judges, lawyers and
prosecutors. This was designed to further monitor the candidate's commit-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Ordinance On Training ForThe Legal Profession, reprinted in Rheinstein, supra note 157,
at 35, sec. 2(1).
164. 1II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 98.
165. See Ordinance On Training For The Legal Profession, supra note 163, at 36, sec. 4(2).
166. III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 98-100. The symbol of one Prussian
camp was a representation of German statutory law suspended from the gallows. Id. at 100.
167. Roetter, supra note 72, at 550-51.
168. Quoted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 99.
169. Roetter, supra note 72, at 551.
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ment to the Nazi cause." ° For instance, after being admitted to practice,
individuals were required to work for three years as a junior attorney in the
office of an established lawyer before they were permitted to practice
independently. Two commentators living in the United States noted that "[a]t
every step through the long process of training it has been possible to
eliminate those whose views are not regular from a Nazi viewpoint."'71 As
a result, "all lawyers in Germany have, to a larger extent than they have with
us, the official point of view and attitude."" 7 As Nazi ideologue Alfred
Rosenberg wrote in 1936 in his book The Myth of The Twentieth Century, the
goal of education is to encourage conformity rather than thought: "'Today
the strongest personality no longer wants individualization but typifica-
tion. . . the folkish, earthbound living style, anew Germanic type, comes
into being.. . to form that type is the task of the twentieth century."'
F. The Reorganization Of The Courts
Pre-Nazi German law was based on uniform criminal and civil codes.
However, primary responsibility for administering the judicial system was
vested in the federated states. The states jealously guarded their authority to
appoint judges and prosecutors and to administer the courts. 74
States generally organized their courts in a similar fashion. The two
thousand local courts (Amtsgerichte) were the workhorses of the judicial
system. Each local court was presided over by a single judge who was
advised by a lay assessor. The local court was vested with original jurisdic-
tion over minor civil suits and criminal offenses which were punishable by
one year or less in prison. 75 Original jurisdiction over more important
civil and criminal cases was exercised by some 180 district courts
(Landgerichte). 76
The principal appellate courts in Germany were called the district courts
of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte). The president of the district court of appeals
also served as the administrative head of the courts within his district.177
The Supreme Court of the Reich (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig was the final
arbiter of the law. It entertained appeals from the district court of appeals
170. See Burke Shartel & Hans Julius Wolff, German Lawyers-Training And Functions, 42
MICH. L. REv. 521, 525-26 (1943).
171. Id. at 526.
172. Id. at 525.
173. Roetter supra note 72, at 548. Ninety-four editions of the book were printed. Id.
174. 1II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 34.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 34-35.
177. Id. at 35.
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as well as criminal appeals from the district courts. The Supreme Court also
possessed original jurisdiction over important treason cases.""
In February 1934, control over the administration of justice was
centralized in the Reich government in Berlin. The Law For The Transfer
Of The Administration Of Justice To The Reich proclaimed that "courts shall
pronounce sentence in the name of the German people.""' The Reich
Minister of Justice was authorized to issue all regulations which were
necessary to transfer the administration of justice to the Reich."RI The
justice ministries of the several states were soon dissolved and the Reich
Ministry of Justice was left as the supreme judicial authority in the
Germany. "
The Hitler regime immediately organized various extraordinary courts.
Special Courts (Sondergerichte) were established in order to adjudicate the
guilt of "opponents of the new regime. " " Each tribunal was composed of
a president and two associates drawn from the sitting judges within the
district. The Special Courts were given jurisdiction over the various offenses
enumerated in the decree of February 28, 1933.3 Their jurisdiction later
was expanded to include violent crimes, highway robbery, crimes against the
war economy and offenses involving opposition to the war and violation of
various internal security measures.' Most of these offenses carried the
possibility of the death penalty and, in certain instances, such as violent
crimes, capital punishment was mandatory." 5 The Special Court also had
178. Id. at 35. The lower court judges were appointed by the governments of the federated
states. The judges of the Reich Supreme Court were appointed by the Reich President. Judges
were guaranteed life tenure and could only be removed by a disciplinary court composed of his
peers. Id. Judicial appointments under the National Socialist regime were centralized in the
Reich Ministry of Justice which sought advice from Nazi party officials. Judges also no longer
enjoyed life tenure. See Roetter, supra note 72, at 536-38.
179. Extracts From The First Law For The Transfer Of The Administration Of Justice To The
Reich, 16 February 1934, reprinted in II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 167-68,
art. 1.
180. Id. at 168, art. 5.
181. Id. at 35-36.
182. Id. at 215. One Special Court was created for each district court of appeal. Id. Party
members were subject to a distinct and more lenient system of criminal punishment. See Law
Of 1 December 1933 Concerning Special Nazi Party And Storm Troops' (SA) Jurisdiction Over
Members Of The Nazi Party, The SA, And Their Subordinate Organizations, reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 166.
183. Decree Of The Reich Government, 21 March 1933, On The Formation Of Special Courts,
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 218 art. 2 [hereinafter Decree On
Special Courts]. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying texts.
184. Decree Of 21 February 1940 Concerning Jurisdiction Of Criminals Courts, Special Courts,
And Additional Provisions Of Criminal Procedure, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 45, at 222-23, art. 13 [hereinafter Decree Concerning Jurisdiction Of Special Courts].
A 1942 decree permitted the president of the Special Court or his deputy to conduct trials
"alone, if he considers the cooperation of his associates dispensable in view of the factual and
legal simplicity of the case, and if the public prosecutor agrees." See Extracts From Decree Of
13 August 1942 For The Further Simplification Of The Administration Of Justice In Criminal
Cases, reprinted in II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 206-07, art. IV.
185. MULLER, supra note 41, at 155.
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jurisdiction over other crimes and offenses if the prosecution was of the
opinion that immediate sentencing by the special Court was required by the
"gravity or the wickedness of the act, by the public excitement aroused or
in consideration of a serious threat to public order or security."1 6
Two aspects of the Special Courts were designed to ensure immediate
and certain punishment. First, there was no legal appeal against a decision
of the Special Court."87 This provision permitted the immediate imposition
of punishment in those cases in which the offender was caught "in the very
act or if his guilt is otherwise obvious." 8 ' In all other cases, punishment
was to be imposed within twenty-four hours." The procedure of the
Special Court thus corresponded to what Supreme Court Justice Otto Schwarz
termed the "'good criminal trial.'"'"' It "'fulfills the aim of punishing a
crime . . . by letting the penalty follow upon the criminal act with the
greatest possible thoroughness and speed, and at the lowest cost. '""' As
observed by Ingo Muller:
The aims of the Nazi leadership with regard to the legal system were in
large measure realized when the Special Courts were created.... The
fact that defendants had no recourse and that a sentence took effect
immediately freed the judges from the necessity of making sure that
procedures were followed carefully and that their decisions would stand up
under review. This made the work of the courts simpler in two ways:
there were no appeals proceedings, and the trials that did take place could
be shorter. '92
Prosecutors, when given a choice between bringing cases before regular
or Special Courts, invariably chose the speedier "'summary courts of the
inner front.'"' 1 These courts offered both efficient procedures and a harsh,
punitive approach to the administration of the criminal law. In Hamburg
between 1936 and 1939, only one out of every six criminal trials took place
before the Special Court. By 1943, two-thirds of all criminal trials in
Hamburg were brought before these tribunals." Muller notes that, the
"Nazi leaders had dreamed of a judicial system in which the harshest of
186. See supra note 184, at 223, art. 14. The Special Court also had jurisdiction over all
crimes joined with offenses within its jurisdiction. Id. at 223-24, art. 15. The Special Court was
required to hand down a decision in a case even if the act with which the defendant was charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Special Court. The only exception was offenses falling
within the jurisdiction of the People's Court. Id. at 225, art. 25.
187. Id. at 225, art. 26.
188. Id. at 224, art. 23(1).
189. Id. art. 23(2).
190. Quoted in MULLER, supra note 41, at 153.
191. Id. at 153-54 (quoting Supreme Court Judge Otto Schwarz).
192. Id. at 154.
193. Id. at 158.
194. Id.
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sentences could be imposed after a minimum of formalities, and with the
Special Courts this wish was fulfilled."195
The next step in the reorganization of the judicial system was the
establishment of the People's Court (VGH). This extraordinary tribunal was
given jurisdiction over treason, which previously had been the preserve of
the Supreme Court." The panel was later also given jurisdiction over
attacks against the Fuehrer, the damaging of military equipment, failure to
report treason and endangering the armed forces of friendly states and
economic sabotage."9 The People's Court was the realization of Hitler's
vision of a revolutionary tribunal which would serve as a forum for the
prosecution and punishment of enemies of the state. In 1930, Hitler had
vowed before a German tribunal that "'[w]hen our movement is victorious,
then a new Supreme Court will be assembled, and before this court . . . you
may be sure heads will roll in the sand.'" 198 The official publication of the
Nazi party's Office for Legal Affairs stated that the "'People's Court must
play the role in the domestic political life of our nation that the army plays
in foreign affairs, for its goal is to guarantee the security of the government
on the home front: here its tasks are similar to those of the state po-
lice."' 19 The Tribunal's senior prosecutor declared that the purpose of the
People's Court was to "annihilate the enemies of National Socialism. '
By the end of 1941, the People's Court had been expanded to six
senates, The first of which was presided over by the president of the VGH.
Each of the senates had responsibility for various portions of the Reich and
the occupied territories." ! They were staffed by seventy eight professional
judges, seventy-four prosecutors and eighty-one lay judges. Seventy-one of
the lay judges were high Nazi Party functionaries and the reminder were
195. Id. at 159. The Special Courts gradually absorbed virtually all significant criminal cases.
See Letter From Thierack, Reich Minister Of Justice, To Presidents Of Courts Of Appeal, 5
July 1943, Discussing Development And Effectiveness Of Special Courts And Proposing
Limitations On Their Jurisdiction, reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45,
at 227. In 1943, Justice Minister Otto Thierack noted that the courts originally had been
envisioned as a "keen weapon for the conviction of political criminals." However, he
complained that the increase in their case load had resulted in inefficiency and a decline in the
severity and uniformity in their sentences. Id. Thierack recommended that only political cases
and cases arousing public excitement should be reserved for the Special Courts. He also
suggested that cases should be brought before the president of the court, sitting as a single judge.
Id. at 230-31.
196. Extract From Law of 24 April 1934 Amending Regulations Of Penal Law And Criminal
Procedure, reprinted in IIl TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 231, art. 1(I)
[hereinafter Law of 24 April 1934].
197. Extracts From Decree, 21 February 1940, Concerning The Jurisdiction Of Criminal
Courts, Special Courts, And Additional Provisions Of Criminal Procedure, reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 234-35, art. 5.
198. MULLER, supra note 41, at 20.
199. Id. at 142.
200. Id.
201. Memorandum From Freisler, President Of The People's Court, I April 1944, Concerning
Assignment Of Various Types Of Cases To The Several Senates Of The People's Court,
reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 238.
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military officers of the rank of colonel and above.' As a visible symbol
of their stature, the judges on the People's Court were permitted to wear the
red robes which previously had been reserved for the justices of the Supreme
Court."t3
Between 1937 and 1944, the Court adjudicated 14,319 cases. The
Tribunal sentenced 5,191 of these defendants to death.'" In July 1942,
Reich Minister Hermann Goebbels addressed the judges who sat on the
People's Court and attacked their lenient treatment of defendants. He
lectured the judges that they
should proceed less from the law than from the basic idea that the offender
was to be eliminated from the community.. . . [Ilt was not so much a
matter of whether a judgment was just or unjust but only whether the
decision was expedient. The State must ward off its internal foes in the
most efficient way and wipe them out entirely. The idea that the judge
must be convinced of the defendant's guilt must be discarded complete-
ly. . . . The criminal must know beforehand that he will lose his head,
should he assault the foundations of the State. 205
The Tribunal developed an insatiable appetite for blood with the
appointment of Roland Freisler to the presidency of the tribunal. In
Freisler's inaugural year of 1942, 1,192 of the 2,572 defendants who came
before the People's Court were sentenced to death; in 1943, 1,662 of the
3,338 defendants received capital punishment; and in 1944, 2,097 of the
4,379 defendants were sentenced to death.2' In 1942, roughly forty-six
percent of defendants were sentenced to death and five percent were
acquitted; in 1943 approximately fifty percent were sentenced to death and
five percent were acquitted; and in 1944, roughly forty-eight percent of
defendants were sentenced to death and about twelve percent were acquit-
ted.2 7 The judges consciously singled out these defendants for harsh treat-
202. KOCH, supra note 64, at 90. By 1944, the number of lay judges had risen to 173, most
of whom were Nazi functionaries. MULLER, supra note 41, at 142-43.
203. MULLER, supra note 41, at 142.
204. Id. at 143.
205. Summary By Dr. Crohne Of The Reich Ministry Of Justice Concerning Goebbels' Speech
To The Members Of The People's Court, 22 July 1942, reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 452-53.
206. MULLER, supra note 41, at 143. Following Franz Gurtner's death in January 1941,
Undersecretary Franz Schlegelberger provisionally filled the post of the Minister of Justice. In
1942, Otto Thierack, President of the People's Court, was appointed Minister of Justice. Roland
Freisler was moved from the ministry to the presidency of the court. Id. at 143. For statistics
on the People's Court, see also Letter From Freisler, President Of The People's Court, To The
Reich Minister Of Justice, 17 January 1944, Transmitting Summary Of Activity Of The People's
Court From 1 January To 31 December 1943 reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra
note 45, at 236. It is alleged that during the twelve years of Hitler's rule that 32,600 people
were sentenced to death in Germany. The People's Court passed 12,891 of these sentences.
KOCH, supra note 64, at 232.
207. KOCH, supra note 64, at 234. The percentage of death sentences differed between the
various senates. Id. at 235.
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ment. It was noted that the accused before the People's Court "are only little
figures of a much greater circle standing behind them which fights the
Reich. "20
The People's Court was designed as an instrument of propaganda as well
as punishment. In 1944, the Justice Minister wrote President Freisler
instructing him to insure that those attending the trial understood the
seriousness of the offense. Minister Thierack wrote that "[e]verybody who
is taking part in the proceedings must have the inner conviction when leaving
the courtroom not only that the punishment was just but also why it was
just. . . . the people must always understand why in these crucial months of
the war the instigator deserves death. .. "I
As the docket of the People's Court increased, President Thierack
proposed that those who were minor figures in treasonous conspiracies
should be transferred without trial to concentration camps. He wrote that "it
is wrong for every follower . . . even the smallest, to be given the honor of
appearing for trial before a People's Court . .. the culprits should
surely be shown that German sovereignty will not put up with their behavior
and that it will take action accordingly." 21
0
In fact, since 1933, The Gestapo (State Police) had been authorized to
detain individuals in protective custody without trial."' They were
confined based upon the fact that their actions were thought to "endanger the
welfare and the security of the people and the State." 2 2 Defendants who
had been acquitted often were seized by the Gestapo immediately following
the court's verdict." 3 The State Police also was empowered to order the
temporary arrest, for up to ten days, of persons who were likely to engage
in subversive activities or who were likely to destroy evidence or who were
suspected of preparing to escape.2"4 Those placed in protective custody
were detained in concentration camps.215 In these camps the detainees
208. Id. at 127 (quoting letter from Otto Thierack to Roland Freisler).
209. Letter From The Reich Minister Of Justice To The President Of The People's Court, 18
October 1944, Commenting Upon Its Functions And The Selection Of Presiding Judges "In
Particularly Important Political Cases," reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
45, at 241-42.
210. Letter From People's Court President, Thierack, To Guertner, 14 August 1940,
Recommending Transfer To Concentration Camps Without Trial of Persons Falling Within A
"Minor Guilt" Category Of High Treason, reprinted in TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
45, at 340-41.
211. Extracts From The Regulations Of The Reich Ministry Of The Interior, 25 January 1938,
Concerning Protective Custody, reprinted in II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at
318-19.
212. Id. at 318-19, art. 1().
213. MULLER, supra note 41, at 175-76. The Ministry of Justice found this practice
embarrassing. As a result, it instructed the presidents of the Courts of Appeals to make certain
that the Gestapo waited until the defendants had exited the courtroom before seizing them. Id.
at 176.
214. Regulations Concerning Protective Custody, supra note 211, at 319-20, art. 3.
215. Id. at 320, art. 6. Protective custody originally was designed to protect an arrestee from
mob violence. Roetter, supra note 72, at 534-35.
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were severely brutalized and were executed for the mildest violations of
camp protocol." 6 Those who were executed usually were euphemistically
reported to have been shot "'while attempting to escape.'" 217
The courts were under continual pressure to speed their procedures and
harshly punish offenders. The Justice Ministry feared that the Gestapo would
eventually be given authority over or completely supplant the judicial
system."" In 1942, a decree required that procedure in penal cases should
be "simplified and expedited, by eliminating all dispensable measures. "219
Indictments and judicial decisions were to be "written in concise style and cut
down to the absolutely necessary."' In the same year, the Justice Ministry
agreed to extend the preventive detention program. The Gestapo was
permitted to systematically transfer prisoners who had already been convicted
and confined in penal institutions to concentration camps. Those who were
to be removed included Jews, Gypsies, Russians, Ukrainians and Poles living
in the Reich and those incarcerated in various German occupied territo-
ries. 1t In 1943, a decree permitted the punishment of Jews by the police
without resort to the courts.=
As the war drew to a close, the last semblance of due process was
discarded. The judicial system came to be infected by the same type of
arbitrary decisions which characterized the process of protective custody. A
February 1945 decree established emergency civil courts martial in areas
"menaced by the approach of the enemy."' The preamble stated those
who fail to fulfill their duties "must at once be called to account with the
necessary severity, so that the State will not suffer damage through the
failing of one single person."' These martial law tribunals consisted of
a single criminal court judge as well as a member of the Leadership Corps
of the Nazi Party and an army or police officer.' The tribunals were
given broad jurisdiction over "all kinds of crimes endangering the German
fighting power or undermining the people's fighting strength and will to
216. SHIRER, supra note 2, at 374-76.
217. MuLLER, supra note 41, at 175.
218. Id. at 181-82.
219. Fuehrer Decree, 21 March 1942, Concerning Simplification Of The Administration Of
Justice, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 203, art. 1.
220. Id. art. H. The decree also permitted the head judge of the various tribunals to restrict
the participation of associate judges. This presumably was intended to centralize control in the
most politically reliable judges. Id. art. I1.
221. Directive On Behalf Of The Reich Minister Of Justice To Public Prosecutors, 22 October
1942, Concerning The "Transfer Of Asocial Prisoners To The Police," reprinted in III TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS, spra note 45, at 343-47.
=. Thirteenth Regulation Under The Reich Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943, reprinted in I[
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 685, si. 1.
223. Decree Of 15 February 1945 On Civilian Courts Martial Procedure, reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 250, art. 1.
224. Id. at preamble.
225. Id. at 251, art. II.
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fight."' They were authorized to sentence offenders to either death or
acquittal or to commit them for trial before a regular court.2
In addition to these extraordinary criminal tribunals, eugenics courts
were established and charged with responsibility for maintaining the purity
and strength of the race. In 1933, the Hereditary Health Courts were
authorized to sterilize those afflicted with a "hereditary disease. . . if. . . a
hereditary impairment of his progeny, either physical or mental, is to be
expected in all likelihood."' According to the law, those suffering from
disease's ranging from schizophrenia to herditary blindness and deafness and
hereditary physical malformation and chronic alcoholism, were to be
sterilized.' The right to propose sterilization was vested in the individu-
al' as well as in a public health officer or superintendent of a hospital,
sanatorium, asylum or penitentiary.221
The Herditary Health Court was presided over by a local county judge
who was joined by a public health officer as well as by another physician
with "expert knowledge of matters pertaining to eugenics."Z' Provision
also was made for appeal to a Higher Herditary Health Court with a similar
composition. 3 The order of the Higher Court was final and the Court
was empowered to order the involuntary sterilization of those subject to its
jurisdiction.z' A December 1933 decree approved the sterilization of
individuals with latent hereditary diseases.' The activity of the courts
finally was suspended in 1944.1
The 181 eugenics courts rarely rejected applications. In their first year
of operation, the tribunals ordered 56,244 sterilizations while rejecting 3,692
applications.2 7 In 1934, only 441 of four thousand persons successfully
appealed their sterilization order. Throughout the Nazi period, only three
226. Id. art. 111(l).
227. Id. art. IV(l). The military courts also became increasingly punitive as the war
progressed. It is estimated that roughly thirty-three thousand death sentences were passed by
Nazi military courts. MULLER, supra note 41, at 184.
228. Law Of 14 July 1933 For The Prevention Of Progeny With Herditary Diseases, reprinted
in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAlS, supra note 45, at 243, at. 1(1).
229. Id. art. 1(2)(3).
230. Id. art. 2.
231. Id. at 244, art. 3.
232. Id. art. 6.
233. Id. art. 10.
234. Id. at 245, art. 12.
235. Extracts From Decree Of 5 December 1933 For The Execution Of The Law For The
Prevention Of Progeny With Hereditary Diseases, reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 45, at 245.
236. Decree Signed By Dr. Conti And Defendant Klemm, 14 November 1944, Temporarily
Suspending Activities Of Higher Herditary Health Courts, And Automatically Legalizing
Pending Contested Decisions, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at
249.
237. ROBERT PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS 102, 106 (1988).
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percent of appeals succeeded.' In all, perhaps 350,000 sterilizations were
performed, resulting in 17,500 fatalities.239 Half of all the cases heard
were initiated on the grounds of congenital feeblemindedness while in twenty-
seven percent of the cases the diagnosis was schizophrenia. The characteris-
tics of both of these diseases, of course, were vague and imprecise.' The
eugenics courts, at times, appeared to be making moral rather than medical
judgments and in their sterilization orders often appeared to be fixated by the
applicant's early sexual experiences, penchant for masturbation and fondness
for alcohol. 1
The policy of preventing the birth of "undesirables" was extended in
"Program T4" which authorized the mass murder of the physically and
mentally disabled. 2 At the beginning of the war, inmates in state hospi-
tals were transferred to extermination sites where they were murdered by
injections or in gas chambers. News of the program gradually spread.
Various prosecutors and judges were disturbed that the exterminations were
being carried out without a decree legally authorizing the procedure. One
local court judge issued an injunction against the "T4" program while
several public officials launched criminal investigations into the scheme.'
The Ministry of Justice convened a high-level meeting of judges and
prosecutors in order to explain that the Fuehrer had personally approved the
program. The officials were instructed that in the future they should refrain
from interference with the killings. Satisfied that the program was lawful,
legal officials turned a blind eye to the murder of more than seventy
thousand "useless eaters." Approximately one hundred thousand more fell
victim to the informal euthanasia program which was instituted after the
official program was terminated in August 1942.'
G. The Reorganization Of Courts In The Occupied Territories
Following the German conquest of Poland, German law was extended
to encompass the occupied territories.' In 1940, the Justice Ministry
issued a decree establishing German courts in the eastern territories.' It
provided that courts in the Incorporated Eastern Territories "shall render
238. Id. at 106-07.
239. MULLER, supra note 41, at 121.
240. Id. at 121-22.
241. Id. at 124.
242. Id. at 126.
243. Id. at 127.
244. Id. at 128. See generally MICHAEL BURLEIGH & WOLFGANG WIPPERMANN, THE RACIAL
STATE: GERMANY 1933-1945, 136-67 (1991).
245. Decree of 6 May 1940 On The Extension Of The Application Of German Criminal Law,
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 195.
246. Decree Of 13 June 1940 Concerning Organization Of Courts In The Incorporated Eastern
Territories, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAIS, supra note 45, at 607.
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judgments in the name of the German people."' 7 A series of special
regulations were issued for the Eastern Territories.' For instance, anyone
who instigated or incited disobedience to a decree or order issued by German
authorities was subject to the death penalty and, in less serious cases, to hard
labor or to imprisonment for a fixed period.'" Capital punishment also
was inflicted on those who uttered anti-German utterances, removed or
defaced official notices or prejudiced the prestige or the well-being of the
German Reich or the German people.' A broad provision also provided
that punishment shall be imposed on Poles or Jews if they "commit any act
for which they deserve punishment in accordance with the fundamental
principles of German criminal law and in view of the interests of the State
in the Incorporated Eastern Territories.""
Prosecutors were given discretion whether to prosecute before Special
Courts, local German courts or, where appropriate, before the People's
Court. 2 Every sentence was to be "carried out without delay."' The
prosecutor was required to lodge an appeal against an unfavorable verdict or
sentence within two weeks.' Poles and Jews were prohibited from
challenging a German judge "on account of alleged partiality."' 5 Although
liable for perjury, Poles and Jews also could not be sworn in as witnesses in
criminal proceedings. As a result, their testimony carried less weight in
court than did that of German witnesses who testified under oath.' The
court and the public prosecutor were permitted "to dispense" with the rules
of criminal procedure "whenever this may be expedient for the rapid and
more efficient conduct of proceedings."' 7 Poles and Jews also were
prohibited from filing private suits.' In January 1942, the substantive and
procedural provisions pertaining to the occupied territories were given
retroactive application to "offenses committed before the decree came into
force."' A decree of December 3, 1942 prohibited German advocates
247. Id. at 607, art. 1.
248. See Decree Of 6 June 1940 On The Introduction Of German Penal Law In The
Incorporated Eastern Territories, reprinted in III TRIAIS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45,
at 608.
249. Id. at 609, sec. 10.
250. Decree Of 4 December 1941 Concerning The Administration Of Penal Justice Against
Poles And Jews In The Incorporated Eastern Territories, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 632, art. 1(3).
251. Id. at 633, art. IX.
252. Id. at 634, art. V, pares. (1)-(3).
253. Id. art. VI(1). Temporary detention of suspects also was permitted. Id. art. VIII(i)-(2).
254. Id. art. VI(2).
255. Id. art. VII.
256. Id. art. IX.
257. Id. at 635, art. XII.
258. Id. at 635, art. XI.
259. Supplementary Decree 31 January 1942, Concerning The Administration Of Penal Justice
Against Poles and Jews In The Incorporated Eastern Territories, id. at 642, art. I.
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from defending Poles in the Incorporated Eastern Territories. This
effectively denied Poles legal representation since Polish lawyers previously
had been prohibited from engaging in legal practice.'
Justice Minister Schlegelberger wrote the Reich Chancellory in 1941 that
"a Pole is less sensitive to the imposition of an ordinary prison sentence.
Therefore, I [have] taken administrative measures to insure that Poles and
Jews be separated from other prisoners and that their imprisonment be
rendered more severe.""' Several months later, Schlegelberger adopted an
even harsher approach. He admonished a group of judges and lawyers that
the Poles constituted a "danger to the security of the German people" and
that they confronted the Reich with an "implacable enemy."' When
challenged by "[ellements clearly criminal and sexual criminals of Polish
Nationality" the appropriate punishment would be "death."'
In October 13, 1942, the Reich Ministry of Justice decreed that it was
no longer necessary to subject Poles, Russians, Jews and Gypsies to trial.
Instead, these defendants were to be turned over to the Gestapo for
punishment.' Justice Minister Thierack wrote that "the administration of
justice can only make a small contribution to the extermination of members
of these peoples ... that is not enough to constitute a material contribution
toward the realization of the above-mentioned aim."' He noted that
"considerably better results" could be achieved by surrendering such persons
to the police, "who can then take the necessary measures unhampered by any
legal criminal evidence."'
On December 7, 1941, Adolf Hitler issued the infamous "Night And
Fog Decree."' The Decree recounted that Communist and other anti-
German forces have increased their attacks on occupation forces in the
occupied territories. As a result, severe measures were required to combat
these "malefactors. "I The decree proclaimed that criminal acts committed
260. Id. at 73. Three Polish advocates were permitted to practice in the Incorporated Eastern
Territory. Id. Similar provisions were extended to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Id.
at 74.
261. Letter From Defendant Schlegelberger To Lammers, 17 April 1941, Concerning "Penal
Laws For Poles And Jews In The Incorporated Eastern Territories," reprinted in III TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 611, 613.
262. Circular Letter From Defendant Schlegelberger To The Presidents Of The Cours Of
Appeal And Attorneys General, 24 July 1941, Entitled "Mild Sentences Against Poles,"
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 628-29. For a justification of the
separate justice system in the occupied territories.
263. Id.
264. Letter From Reich Minister Of Justice Thierack To Bormann, 13 October 1942,
Concerning The "Administration Of Justice Against Poles, Russians, Jews, And Gypsies,"
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 674-75.
265. Id. at 675.
266. Id.
267. Secret Night And Fog Decree Of Hitler, Signed By Keitel, 7 December 1941, Concerning
Measures To Be Taken Against Persons Offering Resistance To German Occupation, reprinted
in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 775.
268. Id. at 776, para. I.
[Vol. 23
34
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 2 [1993], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol23/iss2/2
LAW IN THE THIRD REICH
by non-German civilians against occupation forces should be punishable by
the death penalty.' Trials for such acts were only to take place in the
occupied territories where it appeared probable that capital punishment was
going to be imposed and that the execution "can be carried out without de-
lay."V In other cases, the offenders were to be secretly transported to
Germany." Those who inquired into the fate of the detainees were to be
told that they had been arrested and that the "state of the proceeding does not
allow further information. " 2n
Special Courts were established in France, Norway and Germany and
were charged with conducting secret trials of the detainees.' Defense
counsel in these cases were selected by the presiding judge with the
concurrence of the prosecutor. 4  The presiding judge also was permitted
to waive legal representation in those instances in which the presence of a
defense counsel was considered to be "'superfluous.'" 5 Those who were
acquitted or against whom proceedings were quashed or who had completed
their sentence were to be handed over to the Gestapo. 6
Extraordinary measures were taken to insure that the fate of the detainees
who had been swept up by the Germans would remain a mystery. The goal
was to intimidate the detainees' family, relatives and friends and to spread
fear throughout the occupied territories. Records and statistics were not
maintained, letters were not forwarded and relatives and the press were not
informed in the case of death.' The number of victims of this program
remains uncertain."' One internal survey indicates that when the program
was halted in the fall of 1944 at least 8,639 "Night And Fog" prisoners had
been deported to Germany and brought to trial. 279
In a memorandum accompanying the first implementation decree of the
Night And Fog program, the head of the program, Field Marshal Wilhelm
269. Id. at 776, para. I.
270. Id. para. II.
271. Id.
272. Id. art. III.
273. Circular Decree Of The Reich Ministry Of Justice, Signed By Under Secretary Freisler,
6 February 1942, Assigning Particular Special Courts To Handle Night And Fog Cases,
reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra noted 45, at 784-85, para. 1.
274. Id. at 785, art. 3.
275. Extracts From Official Correspondence Arising Out Of The Question Of Providing
Defense Counsel In Night And Fog Trials, 4 January-19 February 1943, reprinted in III TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 791, 793.
276. Secret Directive Of The Reich Ministry Of Justice, 21 January 1944, Ordering Transfer
To Gestapo Of Night And Fog Prisoners Who Were Acquitted, Against Whom Proceedings
Were Quashed, Or Who Had Served Their Sentences, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 798-99.
277. Secret Instructions Of Reich Ministry Of Justice To Prosecutors And Judges, Initialed By
Defendants Altstoetter, Mettgenberg, And Von Ammon, 6 March 1943, Concerning Measures
Necessary To Maintain Secrecy Of Night And Fog Procedures, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 794-96.
278. MULLER, supra note 41, at 173.
279. Id. at 172.
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Keitel wrote that "even life imprisonment, is. . .a sign of weakness. An
effective and lasting deterrent can only be achieved by death sentences or by
measures which will keep the relatives of the perpetrator and the population
in suspense concerning the fate of the perpetrator." ' M mb= of the Nazi
regime displayed little remorse concerning their treatment of the population
in the occupied territories. Otto Ohlendorf, a Nazi intellectual and former
commander of a German killing squad in the Soviet Union, argued that
'One day those allegedly tortured peoples will understand the blessing it
was for themselves that we have realized our conceptions, because they
bring us victory which will be of benefit not only to us but also to all the
peoples of Europe."'
H. The Modification Of Criminal Law And Procedure
The Nazi regime expanded the scope of the criminal law and imposed
sanctions on a range of relatively innocent activities. Virtually every aspect
of life was regulated. A survey of the Reich law bulletin over a three year
period during the Nazi regime determined that the number of national
statutes, decrees, ordinance, orders and publications exceeded four thou-
sand.m
Some examples of the wide scope of the criminal law include a provision
imposing imprisonment for up to two years for deliberately false or grossly
distorted statements which were likely to debase the welfare of the Reich, or
the prestige of the Reich government or the National Socialist Party.'
Imprisonment also was imposed for statements which demonstrated a
"malicious, inciting or low-minded attitude toward leading personalities" of
the State or the Nazi Party; and for malicious statements "about orders issued
by them or about institutions created by them which are apt to undermine the
confidence of the people in its political leadership."' In addition, inten-
tionally listening to foreign radio stations was punishable by hard labor.'
The deliberate spreading of news from foreign radio stations which was
280. Keitel Letter Of 12 December 1941, Transmitting The First Implementation Decree To
The Night And Fog Decree, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 777-
78.
281. KOCH, supra note 64, at 123-24.
282. Lowenstein, supra note 31, at 781. This did not include the countless regulations enacted
by various subsidiary agencies and governmental units. Id.
283. Law, 20 December 1934, On Insidious Acts Against State And Party For The Protection
Of Party Uniforms Heimtueckegesetz, reprinted in Ill TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
45, at 173, art. 1.
284. Id. at 173-74, art. 2. Statements which were not made in public "shall be punished
equally if the offender reckon that his statements will eventually circulate in public." Id. at 174,
art. 2(2).
285. Decree, 1 September 1939, Concerning Extraordinary Measures With Regard To Foreign
Radio Broadcasts, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 185, art. 1.
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likely to undermine the defensive strength of the German people also was
punishable by hard labor and in particularly severe cases by death.'
A complex series of laws regulated the relationship between "Jews and
German nationals of German or related blood. " ' For instance, marriag-
es' and sexual intercourse between Jews and Germans were prohibit-
ed and were punishable by imprisonment or hard labor.' Jews also
were not permitted to employ female Germans below the age of forty-five in
their household 1 or fly the German flag.'
Typical of the type of issues confronting courts was the definition of
sexual intercourse. In December 1935, the Grand Criminal Panel of the
German Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation and explained that this
was justified by the fact that the law was meant to protect German honor as
well as German blood. The Grand Panel emphasized that courts should not
confine themselves to the letter of the law, but should "'penetrate its inner
core.'" ' Courts responded by treating masturbation, giving as well as
receiving a stomach massage from a physical therapist as sexual inter-
course.' Prosecutors were able to bring these "blood honor" cases before
the Special Courts by indicting the defendants under the Law on Dangerous
Habitual Criminals. This statute authorized the imposition of the death
penalty if the "'protection of society and the need for just atonement requireit.,,,"295
By 1939, the death penalty had been authorized for a wide array of
offenses. For example, capital punishment was meted out to those who
publicly solicited or incited others to evade compulsory military service; or
who publicly sought to "paralyze or undermine the will of the German or
286. Id. at 185, art. 2.
287. Law, 15 September 1935, For The Protection Of German Blood And Honor, reprinted in
I TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 180.
288. Id. art. 1(1).
289. Id. art. 2.
290. Id. at 191, art. 5(l)(2). Only men were held liable under the provision prohibiting sexual
intercourse. Id. art. 5(2).
291. Id. art. 3.
292. Id. art. 5(1). A dizzying array of legal tests were developed to determine whether an
individual was a "Jew." For instance, a "crossbreed" was considered to be an individual with
two entirely Jewish grandparents. A "crossbreed" was considered to be a Jew if they were a
member of the Jewish religious community or were married to a Jewish spouse. These two
qualifications did not apply to "crossbreeds" of foreign nationality. However, German
.crossbreeds" who lost their citizenship by reason of marriage to a foreign Jew were considered
to be Jews. MuLLER, supra note 41, at 98-99.
293. MULLER, supra note 41, at 101.
294. Id. at 102-03.
295. Id. at 112. Under this statute, the death penalty also could be imposed upon offenders who
had committed three crimes the nature of which suggested that they were a dangerous habitual
offender. Most, however, were imprisoned. Although both "German blooded" and Jewish men
were prosecuted under the sexual intercourse provision, Jews were three times as likely to
receive prison sentences. Id. at 104. By the end of 1938, the average sentence was four to five
years in a penitentiary. Id. at 105.
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allied people to assert itself by force of arms."' Offenses committed
against the person or property while "taking advantage of air raid protection
measures" also were punishable in severe cases by death.' In addition,
any criminal act committed by exploitation of the extraordinary conditions
caused by war was punishable by death if the "sound sentiment of the people
requires it because of the particular wickedness of the act."' The Reich
was particularly intolerant of violent street crime. In 1939, the use of a
weapon or dangerous object to commit rape, robbery or any other serious act
or threat of violence was made punishable by death." '9 An attempt to
commit these offenses or aiding and abetting in the commission of these
offenses also was punishable by capital punishment."
As the war intensified, billboards throughout Germany featured a pink
poster announcing the number of death sentences imposed for defeatism, for
listening to foreign broadcasting stations, for plundering following air raids,
and for thefts of postal packages destinid for soldiers at the front. 1 One
of the most infamous prosecutions involved the sentencing to death of the
members of an insignificant student opposition group known as the White
Rose.' Hans Scholl and Christopher Probst, who were attending medical
school, along with Sophie Scholl, a young philosophy student, with the
assistance of other young people wrote and mailed anti-Nazi leaflets,
scattered them on the streets and at the University of Munich and painted
anti-Hitler slogans on walls.' The People's Court ruled that "[i]f a deed
of this sort were to be punished otherwise than by death, we would be
forging the first links of a chain whose end-in an earlier time was 1918 ...
The People's Court knows that it is at one with our soldiers in this deci-
sion. "'
In a subsequent trial, several other members of the White Rose were
sentenced to death. The court criticized Professor Kurt Huber who inspired
296. Extracts From Decree, 17 August 1938, For Special Criminal Law In Time Of War And
Special Emergency, reprinted in III TRIAlS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 188, art. 1.
297. Decree, 5 September 1939, Against Public Enemies, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 188, art. 2.
298. Id. at 189, art. 4.
299. Decree Of 5 December 1939 Against Violent Criminals, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 193-94. art. 1.
300. Id. at 194, art. 4.
301. KOCH, supra note 64, at 228. The statutory limits on punishment were completely
abrogated in 1944. A decree permitted the imposition of hard labor for a limited period, life
imprisonment or death, for any individual who willfully or negligently caused "a specially
serious advantage or a specially serious danger to the war effort or the security of the Reich."
Decree Of 25 August 1944, For The Protection Of The Total War Effort, reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, spra note 45, at 210, art. 1(2).
302. See INGE SHOLL, THE WHITE ROSE MUNICH 1942-1943 (Arthur R. Schultz trans. 1970).
303. See Indictment of Hans and Sophie Scholl and Christoph Probst as drawn up by the Reich
Attorney General to the People's Court, February 21, 1943, reprinted in SHOL., supra note 302,
at 105, 116-17.
304. Id. at 117.
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the students and assisted in drafting one of the leaflets. Huber was castigated
for lecturing about federalism and multiparty democracy instead of propagat-
ing the principles of National Socialism. In the view of the tribunal, Huber
constituted "a blemish upon German scholarship" who richly deserved to
have been removed from his post and stripped of his professorial rights and
privileges.' The Court emphasized that the "days when every man can
be allowed to profess his own political 'beliefs' are past. For us there is but
one standard: the National Socialist one. Against this we measure each
man!" Huber thus has contributed to the national disunity of the Reich and
has earned his death.""
Jurists did not merely mechanically apply the letter of the law. They
were encouraged to creatively construe legal codes in order to obtain
convictions and specifically were instructed to ignore prior precedents.'
Judges were specifically authorized to create "law by analogous application
of penal laws." This methodology permitted jurists to convict an individual
of a criminal offense despite the fact that the individual's conduct was not
specifically prohibited. Article Two of the Criminal Code provided:
Whoever commits an act which the law declares as punishable or
which deserves punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal
law or the sound sentiment of the people, shall be punished. If no specific
penal law can be directly applied to the act, it shall be punished according
to the law whose underlying principle can be most readily applied to the
act. "
As noted by Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt: "Today everyone will recognize that
the maxim 'No crime without punishment' takes priority over the maxim 'No
punishment without law' as the higher and stronger legal truth."' Justice
Minister Franz Gurtner stressed that the law no longer was the sole yardstick
for determining right from wrong:
What is right may be learned not only from the law-but also from the
concept of justice which lies behind the law and may not have found
perfect expression in the law .... [The legislator is aware of the fact that
305. Transcript of the Sentence of Alexander Sehmorel, Kurt Huber, Wilhelm Graf, and
Others Associated with the Resistance of the White Rose, Pursuant to the Trial Held on April
19, 1943, reprinted in SHOLL, supra note 302, at 119, 126.
306. Id. at 127.
307. See Extracts From The Law, 28 June 1935, The Code Of Criminal Procedure And The
Judicature Act, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 177-79, sec. H.
In practice, judgments of the German Supreme Court were considered binding by lower courts.
A reversal of precedent required a plenary session of all the combined Senates of the Supreme
Court. Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 804.
308. Extracts From Law Of 28 June 1935 Amendin The Criminal (Penal) Code, reprinted in
III TRImS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 176-77, art. 2. See also Extracts From The
Law, 28 June 1935, The Code Of Criminal Procedure And The Judicature Act, reprinted in III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 177-78, arts. 170a, 267a.
309. MULLER, supra note 41, at 75.
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he cannot give exhaustive regulations covering all the situations which may
occur in life; he therefore entrusts the judge with filling in the remaining
gaps...310
Judges also arbitrarily presumed facts and broadly interpreted statutes in
order to convict defendants of crimes carrying the death penalty. For
instance, Eastern workers who had been impressed to work inside the Reich
frequently attempted to escape. Those who were apprehended were charged
with treason and prosecuted before the People's Court. The Courts, without
evidentiary support, presumed that the workers were fleeing to Switzerland
to join putative guerilla forces which were being organized to overthrow the
Reich. Prosecutors privately conceded that most workers were driven to
escape to Switzerland by their inadequate salaries, poor rations and harsh
conditions of employment.311 Courts also broadly interpreted the prohibi-
tion against publicly attempting to paralyze or undermine the will of the
German or an allied nation to defend itself. The judiciary presumed that any
critical remark had the impact of psychologically weakening the will of the
Reich population to pursue the war against the Allied Powers. 32  For
example, a Dutch pianist, Karlrobert Kreiten, while on a concert tour in
Berlin, remarked to his companion, who was an ardent National Socialist,
that Hitler was "brutal, sick, and insane," and predicted that the National
Socialist regime would lose the war and would be toppled from power.313
Kreiten was prosecuted and convicted before the People's Court. In
imposing the death penalty, the tribunal proclaimed that "'[w]hoever acts as
Kreiten did is doing... precisely as our enemies would wish. He becomes
their henchman in their war of nerves against the steadfastness of our peo-
ple. .... '"314 The Tribunal reasoned that Kreiten's remark qualified as
public since it impacted on "the fundamental political thought of our
nation. "315 Justice Minister Otto Thierack was motivated to write the
President of the People's Court Roland Freisler in September 1943 that the
decision had "'robbed'" the concept of "'public'" of "'all meaning. '"316
The Nazi regime also undermined the due process principles that all
judgments should be considered to be final and that individuals should not be
twice prosecuted for the same offense. The "extraordinary objection"
permitted the Chief Reich Prosecutor to file an objection within one year
310. DOCUMENTS, supra note 30, at 483. Another innovation was the doctrine of "'theological
concepts.'" This permitted judges to examine the intent underlying a legal doctrine and to
determine whether the rule should be applied. For instance, a Jew might be denied the right to
resort to self-defense against a German since the doctrine might be viewed as being limited to
the protection of Aryans. MULLER, supra note 41, at 80-81.
311. III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 82-83.
312. MULLER, supra note 41, at 145-47.
313. Id. at 147.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 148.
316. Id.
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after a sentence had become final "if, because of serious misgivings as to the
justness of the sentence, he deem[ed] a new trial and decision in the case
necessary."31 The Special Penal Senate of the Reich Supreme Court was
required to try the case against which the objection had been lodged a
"second time.""
Extraordinary appeals were entered on twenty-one occasions. In four
cases sentences were substantially increased and in fourteen instances prison
sentences were changed to the death penalty. One appeal was lodged on
behalf of a German police officer who had been convicted of beating a
confession out of a detainee. The Department of Justice cancelled the
proceedings before the Special Panel could rule. In two instances, sentences
were slightly reduced.3"9
In 1940, the "nullity plea" was introduced to enable the prosecutor's
office to appeal what it viewed as faulty legal interpretations?' The Chief
Public Prosecutor was authorized to appeal against a final judgment within
one year from the date of its becoming final, "if the judgment is unjust
because of an erroneous application of law on established facts."321 The
Reich Supreme Court was authorized to quash the lower court decision and
to enter a new verdict or to refer the case to the original court or to a new
court for retrial.' Ingo Muller writes that roughly three-quarters of the
appeals were filed on behalf of the prosecution. The cases in which the
Supreme Court "failed to accede to the wishes of public prosecutors were ex-
tremely rare. In only one case out of twelve was the plea that had been
entered against a lower court's decision... rejected."3'3 In such instances,
the Supreme Court typically would refer the case back to the lower court and
would instruct the lower court as to what it considered to be a "'just'"
decision.'
The Supreme Court used these occasions to encourage lower and
associated courts to expansively interpret statutory provisions. For instance,
the punishment of those who exploited the extraordinary conditions caused
by war to commit a criminal act traditionally had been interpreted to
317. Extract From Law, 16 September 1939, Amending Regulations Of General Criminal
Procedure, Military Criminal Procedure, And The Penal Code, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 405, art. 3(2).
318. Id. at 405, art. 3(2). Where the first sentence was passed by the People's Court, the
objection was to be filed with the People's Court. Id. at 406, art. 3(3). The Special Penal
Senate was comprised of the President of the Supreme Court along with two associate and two
lay judges. Roetter, supra note 72, at 534.
319. MULLER, supra note 41, at 129. In extraordinary appeals to the Special Senate of the
People's Court, the death sentence was imposed in roughly seventy percent of the cases. See III
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 89.
320. Decree Of 21 February 1940 Concerning The Nullity Plea, reprinted in III TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 410.
321. Id. at 410, art. 34.
322. Id. at 410-11, art. 35(4).
323. MuLLER, supra note 41, at 130.
324. Id. at 131.
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encompass serious offenses. In one case, however, the Supreme Court ruled
that the death penalty, rather than a small fine, should have been imposed on
an individual who wrote love letters to a married woman whose husband was
absent in the military. The Court reasoned that this "insulting behavior" had
been committed by exploiting the unusual circumstances "caused by the
war."' In other cases, the Supreme Court and special courts interpreted
the law which made the death sentence mandatory for certain crimes
committed through the use of a dangerous weapon to include offenses
committed using a bell, a foot and the perpetrator's hands.' In another
case, the Supreme Court unilaterally imposed the death penalty on a Pole
who had given a pair of pants to a Serbian prisoner of war. The Pole
explained that he had felt pity for the Serb and intended to help him escape.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Pole was guilty of treason since the
defendant should have anticipated that the Serb would flee and join Tito's
guerilla forces.'
Courts thus demonstrated a willingness to brazenly bend their decisions
and procedure to the political ideology of the National Socialist regime. The
judiciary seemed to be able to accept any excess so long as it was embodied
in a formal agreement or decree. For instance, the Ministry of Justice
objected to the Gestapo's practice of beating and abusing defendants prior to
trial. The use of force to extract guilty pleas and confessions was viewed by
some judges as an unacceptable interference with the integrity of the judicial
process. However, the Ministry's qualms were allayed when the Gestapo
entered into an agreement in which it pledged to limit the beatings to certain
categories of political prisoners.3' The agreement specified that "[a]s a
general principle ... only blows with a club on the buttocks are permissible,
up to the number 25 .... Beginning with the tenth blow, a physician must
be present. A standard club will be designated, to eliminate all irregulari-
ties. "3
II. THE PROSECUTION OF NAZI JURISTS
In 1947, in United States v. Josef Altstoetter et. al., the United States
prosecuted and convicted fourteen former members of the German legal
325. Id. at 133.
326. Id. at 134.
327. Extract From The Testimony Of Defendant Rothaug Concerning A Case Where, After A
Nullity Plea, The Reich Supreme Court Changed A Prison Sentence To The Death Sentence
Without Referring The Case Back To The Special Court Of First Instance, reprinted in III
TRIAS OF WAR CRIMINAIS, supra note 45, at 416.
328. MUmLE, supra note 178-79.
329. Id. at 179.
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establishment for international penal offenses.' Ten were convicted and
four were sentenced to life terms, four to ten years in prison, one defendant
to seven years in the penitentiary and one to five years." The indictment
charged the defendants with participation in one or more of four criminal
acts. Count one alleged that the defendants had been involved in a
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity between
January 1933 and April 1945;332 count two charged the defendants with the
commission of war crimes against civilians in the territories occupied by
Germany and against members of the armed forces of nations at war with
Germany after September 1939; count three alleged that the defendants had
committed crimes against humanity against both German civilians and the
nationals of occupied countries after the outbreak of World War II. Court
four charged several of the defendants with membership in organizations
which had been declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal at
Nurenberg. The specific offenses alleged in the indictment included murder,
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds, deportation and
enslavement, plunder of private property, torture and other atrocities.'x
American prosecutor Telford Taylor, in his opening statement, observed
that the prosecution was "unusual" in that the defendants were charged with
crimes "committed in the name of the law."' Together with their de-
330. III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 954. Those indicted were Josef
Altstoetter, an official in the Ministry of Justice; Wilhelm Von Ammon, official in the Ministry
of Justice; Paul Banickel, prosecutor in the People's Court; Hermann Cuhorst, Chief Judge of
the Special Court; Karl Engert, an official in the Ministry of Justice; Guenther Joel, legal
adviser to the Ministry of Justice; Herbert Klemm, an official in the Ministry of Justice, Ernst
Lautz, Chief Prosecutor of the People's Court; Wolfgang Mettgenberg, an official in the
Ministry of Justice; Guenther Nebelung, Chief Justice of the Fourth Senate of the People'sCourt; Rudolf Oeschey, Judge of the Special Court in Nuernberg; Hans Petersen, Lay Judge of
the First Senate of the People's Court; Oswald Rothaug, Senior Public Prosecutor of the
People's Court and formerly Chief Justice of the Special Court in Nuernberg; Curt
Rothenberger, an official in the Ministry of Justice; Ranz Schlegelberger, an official in the
Ministry of Justice; and Carl Westphal, an official in the Ministry of Justice. For a biographical
description of the defendants, see id. at 15-17.
331. The defendants convicted were Schlegelberger to life in prison; Klemm, to life in prison;
Rothenberger to seven years in prison; Lautz to ten years in prison; Mettgenberg to ten years
in prison; Von Ammon to ten years in prison; Joel to ten years in prison; Rothaug to life in
prison; Oeschey to life in prison; Altstoetter to five years in prison. Id. at 1199-2001. Two
central figures, Franz Guertner and Georg Thierack both had passed away prior to the filing of
the indictment. Id. at 3.
332. The Tribunal ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the conspiracy charge and treated
count one as a alleging the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id. at 4.
333. Id. at 3. Altstoetter, Cuhorst, Engert and Joel were charged with membership in the StatePolice (SS); Cuhorst Oeschey, Nebelung and Rothaug were charged with membership in the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party; and Joel was charged with membership in SD, the domestic
intelligence branch of the SS. Id. at 25-26. The legal test applied was whether a defendant
became or remained a member of the organization with knowledge that the organization was
being used for the commission of acts declared criminal or who were personally implicated as
members of the organization in the commission of crimes. Id. at 1030.
334. Id. at 31. The three United States judges were Carrington T. Marshall, formerly Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio; Judge James T. Brand, Justice of the Supreme Court ofOregon; Judge Malory b. Blair, Associate Justice of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third
District of Texas. Judge Marshall retired from the case due to illness. Judge Brand succeeded
43
Lippman: They Shoot Lawyers Don't They?: Law in the Third Reich and the Gl
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
300 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ceased and fugitive colleagues, these men "were the embodiment of what
passed for justice in the Third Reich."I
Indeed, the root of the accusation here is that those men, leaders of the
German judicial system, consciously and deliberately suppressed the law,
engaged in an unholy masquerade of brutish tyranny disguised as justice,
and converted the German judicial system to an engine of despotism,
conquest, pillage, and slaughter.
The defendants and their colleagues distorted, perverted, and finally
accomplished the complete overthrow of justice and law in Germany.
The made the system of courts an integral part of dictatorship. They
estalished and operated special tribunals obedient only to the political
dictates of the Hitler regime. They abolished all semblance of judicial
independence. They brow-beat, bullied, and denied fundamental nghts to
those who came before the courts. The "trials" they conducted became
horrible farces, with vestigial remnants of legal procedure which only
served to mock the hapless victims?'
The trial of the Nazi jurists, according to Taylor, was more than an effort to
extract retribution against those who engaged in criminal acts against
innocent civilians and combatants. It was the first step towards the redemp-
tion and reconstruction of the German legal system which the defendants had
so ignominiously "defiled... and delivered.., into the dictatorship of the
Third Reich." 7
The Tribunal was organized under Control Council Law No. 10. Under
this agreement, the four occupying powers recognized the right of each of the
Allied Powers to prosecute those within their zone suspected of crimes
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.338 The Tribunal
ruled that Control Council Law No. 10 was an expression of the "assumption
and exercise of supreme governmental power by the Allies."' The
prosecution of these jurists was part of a larger effort to foster democratic
and humanitarian values in German society.' It also was stressed that the
Judge Marshall as presiding judge. The alternative judge, Judge Justin W. Harding, formerly
Assistant Attorney General of Ohio and District Judge of the First Division of the Territory of
Alaska took judge Harding's place. Id. at 13.
335. Id. at 31.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 33.
338. Control Council Law No. 10 (1945) reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG IUTARY TRMUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCILLAw No. 10, at XVIII, XX,
arts. II-Ill.
339. Id. at 960.
340. Id. The Tribunal ruled that the United States and the other Allied Powers were not bound
by the rules of land warfare which limit a belligerent's activities in occupied territory. Id. at
961.
The clear implication from the foregoing is that the Rules of Land Warfare apply to
the conduct of a belligerent in occupied territory so long as there is an army in the
field attempting to restore the country to its true owner, but that those rules do not
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trial was not an arbitrary exercise of raw sovereign power-the defendants
merely were being prosecuted for violating preexisting principles of
international law."' Those who now stood before the Tribunal clearly
were aware that the international community had condemned those Germans
who had been personally responsible for the commission of war crimes and
crimes against humanity following World War I. The Allied Powers also
had repeatedly warned the leadership of the Reich that they would be held
accountable for the atrocities which they had visited upon the inhabitants of
Europe.32
The American Judges rejected the defense that the defendants had relied
on German domestic law and thus could not be held criminally liable for
their purported criminal activities. They stressed that the essence of the
charges lodged against the German jurists was that by enforcing the laws of
the Third Reich that they had furthered the criminal policies of the Nazi
regime. Their obeisance to domestic law cannot provide them with a defense
against the requirements of international law which remain "superior in
authority to any German statute or decree."'
The very essence of the prosecution case is that the laws, the Hitlerian
decrees and the Draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system
themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes against
humanity and that participation in the enactment and enforcement of them
amounts to complicity in crime. We have pointed out that governmental
participation is a material element of the crime against humanity. Only
when official organs of sovereignty participated in atrocities and persecu-
tion did those crimes assume international proportions. It can scarcely be
apply when belligerency is ended, there is no longer an army in the field, and, as in
the case of Germany, subjugation has occurred by virtue of military conquest.
Id. at 962.
341. Id. at 966. These principles had previously been recognized by the International Military
Tribunal and by the United Nations General Assembly. Id. at 968.
342. Id. at 978. The Tribunal certainly struck out in an unprecedented direction when it argued
that international common law recognized crimes against humanity committed against a domestic
population. It argued that systematic governmental participation in atrocities and offenses against
a country's domestic population or amounting to persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds were cognizable under international law. The Tribunal argued that such gross and
persistent brutalities imperil international peace and security and thus are of international
concern. Id. at 982.
The force of circumstances, the grim fact of world-wide interdependence, and the
moral pressure of public opinion have resulted in international recognition that certain
crimes against humanity committed by Nazi authority against German nationals
constituted violations not alone of statute but also of common international law.
Id. at 979.
The Tribunal, however, limited its consideration of the defendants' guilt or innocence to
the period following the outbreak of the war in 1939. Id. at 985.
343. Id. at 984.
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said that governmental participation, the proof of which is necessary for
conviction, can also be a defense to the charge '
The Tribunal also refused to permit the defendants to invoke the defense
of judicial immunity. The Court explained that such immunity is premised
on the notion of an independent judiciary which impartially administers the
law in good faith. The American panel ruled that in view of the German
judiciary's subordination to the Nazi regime that there was "no merit in the
suggestion that Nazi judges are entitled to the benefit of the Anglo-American
doctrine of judicial immunity."'
The "function of the Nazi courts was judicial only in a limited sense.
They more closely resembled administrative tribunals acting under directives
from above in a quasi-judicial manner."' The Tribunal also noted that
courts traditionally had not recognized judicial immunity for acts of
"malfeasance in office."' 7
The American judges held the defendants liable for four legal activities:
the arbitrary administration of the law; the prosecution of defendants for
treason; the "Night And Fog" program; and the racially discriminatory
application of the law. The panel declined to enter a ruling as to whether
German law unduly punished habitual criminals, looters, hoarders or those
guilty of undermining the defensive strength of the nation.' As to the
limitations on freedom of speech which were imposed in Germany, it noted
that "even under the protection of the Constitution of the United States a
citizen is not wholly free to attack the Government or to interfere with its
military aims in time of war."' In addition, the tribunal held that the mere
enforcement of the criminal law against opponents of the war did not
constitute criminal liability for involvement in wars of aggression. It argued
that those outside the Nazi inner circle were not aware of Hitler's plans. At
any rate, the American judges went on to explain that the extension of
liability below the policy-level would mean that "every soldier who marched
under orders into occupied territory or who fought in the homeland was a
criminal and a murderer. The rules of land warfare . . . would not be the
measure of conduct and the pronouncement of guilt in any case would
become a mere formality."'
344. Id. The indictment did not charge the murder or abuse of any particular person or groups.
Instead, the indictment was couched in general terms in order to emphasize that the defendants
were involved in a large-scale, organized system of cruelty and injustice in violation of the laws
of war and of humanity. Id. at 984-95.
345. Id. at 1024.
346. Id. at 1024-25.
347. Id. at 1024.
348. Id. at 1125-26.
349. Id. at 1026.
350. Id. at 1027.
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Defendants, however, were held criminally liable for having enforced the
law in an arbitrary, harsh and discriminatory fashion which was "shocking
to the conscience of mankind."" Those judges were held liable who had
distorted or ignored evidence, perverted statutory requirements, denied
defendants due process of law and who had punished Jews, Gypsies and
Slavs more harshly than German defendants.2
Defendants involved in prosecuting, convicting and sentencing defendants
who had attempted to escape from the Reich for high treason also were held
criminally liable. The Tribunal pointed out that the territory which the
defendants were charged with attempting to depart consisted primarily of
portions of Poland. At the time of the defendants' prosecutions, Germany
could claim the status of an occupying power, but did not possess sovereignty
over the Polish territory. According to the Court, prosecution in these cases
represented an unwarrantable extension of the concept of high treason and
constituted a war crime and a crime against humanity. The "wrong done in
such prosecutions was not merely in misnaming the offense of attempting to
escape from the Reich; the wrong was in falsely naming the act high treason
and thereby invoking the death penalty for a minor offense.'
Officials in the Ministry of Justice, judges and public prosecutors also
were held liable for having participated in the "Night And Fog" pro-
gram. ' According to the Tribunal, this program "violated... every
principle of the law of military occupation."'" The policy was to "terrorize
and in some instances to exterminate the populations.' It concluded that
those who "respect human rights and human personality and dignity can
hardly believe that the Nazi judicial system could possibly have been so cruel
and ruthless in their treatment of the population of occupied areas and
territories."'
Lastly, the defendants were charged with involvement in a governmental
plan and program for the persecution and extermination of Jews and Poles.
This plan was described as having "transcended territorial boundaries as well
as the bounds of human decency."' According to the Tribunal, such racial
discrimination, when enforced in the occupied territory, constituted war
crimes and when applied within Germany comprised crimes against humani-
ty ' Some of the defendants took part in the drafting of laws and decrees
which firthered the aim of exterminating Poles and Jews in Germany and
351. Id. at 1165.
352. See id. at 1159-70 (discussing Rudolf Oeschey).
353. Id. at 1028.
354. Id. at 1055.
355. Id. at 1060.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1061. The illegalities in this program included the deportation of defendants, id. at
1059, the denial of due process, id. at 1061, and the mistreatment of internees. Id.
358. Id. at 1063.
359. Id. at 1081.
1993]
47
Lippman: They Shoot Lawyers Don't They?: Law in the Third Reich and the Gl
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
304 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
throughout Europe. Others participated in the enforcement of these
discriminatory laws. Finally, various judges "distorted and then applied the
laws and decrees against Poles and Jews as such in disregard of every
principle of judicial behavior."' All these defendants were held liable as
principals or accessories to the crime of racial persecution which they
variously helped to design, further and to carry out. 1
One of the central defendants was Franz Schlegelberger. Schlegelberger
had progressed through the judicial bureaucracy before being appointed to the
Ministry of Justice in 1931. He served as undersecretary and upon the death
of Minister Franz Guertner was appointed acting Minister for roughly
nineteen months.' Although Schlegelberger was not a confirmed Nazi,
he was involved in drafting or approving programs ranging from the Night
And Fog decree to the special judicial procedures to be applied against Poles
and Jews in the occupied territories.' He also willingly revised various
criminal sentences in response to requests from Hitler and from those in the
Fuehrer's inner-circle.'
Schlegelberger excused his behavior on the grounds that he feared that
if he resigned that a "worse man would take his place."' In fact, he was
succeeded by Otto Thierack who permitted the police to usurp the administra-
tion of justice and "murdered untold thousands of Jews and political
prisoners."' However, the Tribunal ruled that the fact that countless more
might have been executed under another Minister, did not excuse Schlegel-
berger's criminal conduct. His guilt also was not lessened by the fact that
the numbers tortured and killed paled in comparison to those exterminated
by the Nazis in pogroms, deportations and death camps.6 7 The American
judges concluded that the "prostitution of a judicial system for the accom-
plishment of criminal ends involves an element of evil to the State which is
not found in frank atrocities which do not sully judicial robes."' The
Tribunal fully recognized that Schlegelberger was a "tragic character" who
loved the "life of an intellect, [and] the work of the scholar. "I Despite the
fact that he likely "loathed the evil did," the fact remains that Schlegelberger
"sold that intellect and that scholarship to Hitler for a mess of political
pottage and for the vain hope of personal security." 3'
360. Id. at 1063.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1082-83.
363. Id. at 1084-85.
364. Id. at 1085-86.
365. Id. at 1086.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1087.
370. Id.
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In contrast to Schlegelberg, most of the other defendants displayed
neither contrition or remorse. Defendant Oswald Rothaug, chief prosecutor
of the People's Court and a former Chief Judge on the Special Court at
Nurenberg, was described by the American jurists as "the personification of
the secret Nazi intrigue and cruelty" and as a "sadistic and evil man.""'
Rothaug's court was characterized as an "instrumentality of terror which won
the fear and hatred of the population."3n In his closing statement, Rothaug
defended his conduct and explained that he fulfilled his assignments with "a
pure heart, and without malice. "I
I applied the laws of my country in the manner in which they were
intended, to the best of my conscience and belief.... We were no
specialists in crimes against humanity, and no proof has been furnished in
any single case that, in any connection, we had applied an illegal meth-
od. 374
Rudolf Oeschey succeeded Rothaug as Chief Judge of the Nuernberg Court.
He was pictured as even more vindictive and spiteful than Rothaug. Oeschey
regularly insulted and humiliated defendants and was described as being
intent on exterminating racial minorities and enemies of the Reich. 5
Oeschey, like Rothaug, explained that as a dutiful judge that he had been
obligated to enforce the letter of the law.
I always acted in the belief and in the conviction that I was doing right, by
obeying the law to which I was subjected and applying it in the manner in
which my conscience told me to. And it is the truth that it was a matter
of conscience for me not to misuse the law in a criminal way, but to apply
it in accordance with the will of the legislator, and to grant the offender a
proper trial and a just verdict. Therefore, my conscience knows that it is
clear of the crimes with which I am charged."
III. COMBATING THE GLOBAL THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE
OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
A. The Contemporary Threat To The Independence Of Judges
The imponderable questions remain. Why did the German legal
profession conform to the dictates of the Nazi regime? Could and should
371. Id. at 1156.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 947.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1168.
376. Id. at 952. Courts in the Federal Republic of Germany for the most part refused to convict
former jurists of war crimes. See MULLER, supra note 41, at 274-92. Former Nazi jurists made
a swift transition and assumed leading roles in the legal system of the Federal Republic of
Germany. See Mathias Reimann, National Socialist Jurisprudence And Academic Continuity: A
Comment On Professor Kaufinann's Article, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1651 (1988).
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jurists have protested the National Socialists' perversion of the legal system? 3"
The expulsion of Social Democratic, Communist and Jewish lawyers and
judges denuded the legal profession of those most likely to challenge the
legal policies of the Third Reich. The remainder acquiesenced out of a
combination of ambition, avarice, pragmatism, peer pressure, ideology and
fear. They psychologically distanced themselves from the consequences of
their actions and allayed their doubts by foisting responsibility onto their
superiors.35
The legal establishment was not comprised of zealous Nazis. Only a
handful of the key jurists in the National Socialist regime were veterans of
the Nazi movement. Most were conservative nationalists who had estab-
lished their reputations prior to Hitler's ascendancy to power.Y Yet,
Doctor Lothar Kreyssig, a judge at the Court of Guardianship, in the town
of Brandenburg, on the Havel River, was the only sitting judge who publicly
protested the excesses of the Nazi regime. He eventually was permitted to
resign with full pension rights.'
The events in Germany, are not merely an isolated historic tragedy.
Judges and lawyers throughout the world continue to be threatened. Non-
democratic regimes have sought to limit their independence and to transform
the legal system into a mechanism for legitimizing and implementing
governmental policies.8 Judges who have refused to acquiesce, at times,
377. On the duty of Germans to protest laws which did not comply with natural law principles,
see Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes Of Legal Philosophy, in III READINGS FOR LEADERS: LAW,
JUSTICE AND THE COMMON GOOD A GREAT DEBATE AND A SEARCH FOR MEANING 175 (1988).
Following the war, a lively debate was ignited concerning whether those who informed on their
German neighbors and relatives should now be subject to criminal punishment. See Recent
Cases, Criminal Law-In General-German Ctizen Who Pursuant To Nazi Statute Informed On
Husband For Expressing Anti-Nazi Sentiments Convicted Under Another German Statute In Effect
At Time Of Act, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1951). See generally Lon L. Fuller, Appendix: The
Problem Of The Grudge Informer, in THE MORAITY OF THE LAW 245 (rev. ed. 1969). H.L.A.
Hart argued that morality and law are distinct. The prosecution of the informers thus should not
be based on the theory that the National Socialist statutes were too immoral to constitute law.
According to the Hart, the prosecution of informers should be based on a retroactive statute
declaring that the Nazi statutes were abrogated. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and Separation of Law
And Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615-29 (1958). Lon Fuller argued that the Nazi legal
system was a perversion of what he termed the inner morality of law. Fundamental canons of
interpretation and statutory principles, such as clarity and precision, were disregarded. As a
result, Fuller argued that the informers should not be able to rely on the defense that their
actions were in accord with then-existing legal statutes. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity,
Reply To Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 645-61 (1958).
378. On the capacity of professionals to rationalize their immoral conduct during the Third
Reich see generally ROBERT JAY LIFrON, THE NAzI DOCTORS MEDICAL KILUNG AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986).
379. See MULLER, supra note 41, at 38-39, 45. See also KOCH, supra note 64, at 17-18.
380. MULLER, supra note 41, at 193-95. Two judges who were involved in assassination plots
against Hitler were executed in 1945, Dr. Karl Sack, a general staff judge, and Dr. Johann von
Dohnanyi, a Supreme Court Judge. Id. at 192.
381. The Nazi legal system was a prototype for contemporasy totalitarian regimes. Some of the
characteristics of such political systems include a resort to extra-judicial punishment; a disregard
of fundamental legal norms, such as notice of legal provisions, the finality of judgments, a
prohibition on double jeopardy and retroactive punishment; a reliance on harsh, certain and swift
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have been dismissed,"7 threatened,3 and in extreme cases, they have
been kidnapped' and assassinated.30 In some countries, the judiciary
also has been under attack by opposition guerilla groups and organized crime
syndicates. These interests have attempted to intimidate judges into refusing
to preside over criminal trials or into acquitting or handing out light
sentences to gang members.386 Argentina vividly illustrates the precarious
political independence enjoyed by judiciary. Disgruntled Argentine regimes
have replaced the members of the Argentinean Supreme Court six times in
the past thirty-one years.8
punishment; a simplification of legal procedures such as a limitation on appeals; a differential
quality of justice meted out to groups based upon their varying social status; the extension of
criminal law to encompass a range of private conduct and public actions which pose minimal
social harm; and a concern with political crime and the establishment of special political courts.
See generally Mark S. Baker, The South American Legal Response To Terrorism, 3 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 67 (1985).
382. See Centre For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, Report On The Harassment
And Persecution Of Judges And Lawyers, ICJ NEWSLETTER, July-September 1989, at 16
[hereinafter First Report]. The Malaysian Supreme Court's decision in several cases was
unfavorable to the government. In 1988, the Prime Minister initiated several public attacks
against the judges. The Lord President of the Court privately complained to the King and was
subsequently removed. Two other judges who objected to the Lord President's removal also
were removed. Id. See generally Geoffrey Robertson, Malaysia: Justice Hangs In The Balance,
CUL BULL., October 1988, at 8. See also Centre For The Independence Of Judges And
Lawyers, Report On The Harassment And Persecution of Judges And Lawyers, ICJ NEWSLET-
TER, July-September 1990, at 15, 16 [hereinafter Second Report]. In the Sudan, fifty-eight
leading judges were dismissed following the June 1989 coup. The bar association also was
banned and thirteen lawyers were incarcerated. Id. (The ICJ, International Commission Of
Jurists is a group of prominent international jurists who investigate and report on human rights
violations throughout the world. The International Commission established the CILJ, The Centre
For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, to report on threats to the independence of the
legal system).
383. Centre For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, Odle, CIUL BULL, April 1988,
at 1-2. A judge investigating allegations of torture against the state security police during
military rule received threats against himself and his wife and had his home burglarized. Id. See
also Second Report, supra note 382, at 16. Eight Argentinean judges who were investigating
police corruption were threatened and were targeted for assassination. Id.
384. Centre For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, Guatemala, ICJ BULL, Oct. 1988,
at 4-5. On July 20, 1988, Judge Julio Anibal Trejo Duque who was presiding over the trial of
a group of Treasury Police accused of numerous kidnappings was himself kidnapped by ten
heavily armed men. A police agent and friend of Judge Trejo's later was found beaten to death
and his body was found near the place where the judge's car was located after the abduction.
Id.
385. Centre For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, El Salvador, IJL BULL, Oct.
1988, at 3-4. On May 11, 1988, Judge Jorge Alberto Serrano was shot and killed in front of his
home. Judge Serrano was to issue a decision in the next few days pertaining to whether military
officers jailed for involvement in a kidnapping-for-profit scheme were eligible to be released
under an amnesty provided for under the Central American peace accords. Judge Miriam
Artiaga, who initially had been assigned to the case, had withdrawn after her house had been
machine gunned. Id.
386. Columbian judges have been singled out for attacks by drug cartels. In one year, thirty-
seven judges and lawyers were killed. See Second Report, supra note 382, at 16.
387. Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection Of Judicial Independence In Latin America, CIJL BULL,
Oct. 1988, 13, at 30. Other Latin American judiciaries which have been subject to attack
include, Brazil, El Salvador and Peru. Id. at 30-31.
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More subtle steps also have been taken to influence the judiciary.
Contumacious judges have been punished by being transferred to distant
courts. They also have been reassigned to courts, such as those concerned
with taxation, where they pose little threat to the regime. In other cases,
judges have been appointed for limited periods and the terms of those who
have proven to be independently-minded have not been renewed. Alterna-
tively, the established rules or conventions governing the appointment of
judges have been suspended or abrogated and judicial appointments have
been made on political grounds.' Some regimes have demonstrated less
subtlety and have merely issued emergency decrees which have vested
criminal jurisdiction in military or in specially constituted courts." Other
tactics of intimidation have included public attacks and agitation against the
judiciary; investigations into judicial conduct; and the denial of adequate
budgetary support, salaries and pensions to judges.'
Criminal defense and human rights lawyers also have been under
attack. " ' Governments have imposed limits on lawyers' statements and
activities.' Activist lawyers also have been exposed to governmental
surveillance and harassment; 3  have been subject to detention without
trial;' charged with criminal offenses stemming from their representation
of their clients;' and have been assassinated.' In other cases, bar
388. The Independence And Impartiality Of The Judiciary, Jurors And Assessors And The
Independence Of Lawyers, 42 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, 42nd Sess., Agenda Item 11, at 8, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/35 (1987)
[hereinafter Judicial Independence and Impartialy].
389. Id. at 9.
390. Id.
391. See Center For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, Brazil, CIJL BULL., April-
October 1987, at 3-4. In Brazil wealthy landowners have organized para-military squads to
intimidate lawyers working with agricultural workers. Between 1977 and 1984, at least thirty
lawyers were victims of assassination attempts or of assassination. Id.
392. Center For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, Indonesia, CIJL BULL, Apr.-Oct.
1987, at 6-7. The Indonesian government prohibited lawyers from acting, behaving, assuming
attitudes, using words or issuing statements that, among other things, display disrespect for the
legal system, the courts and legal officials. The judiciary was authorized to impose disciplinary
measures against lawyers ranging from disbarment to disbarment for life. Id.
393. See Michael Krinsky, F.B.I Harassment Of The National Lawyers Guild, CUL BULL.,
Apr. 1988, at 26.
394. See Center For The Independence Of Lawyers And Judges, Singapore, CUL BULL., Apr.
1988, at 14-15. Three lawyers were detained in 1987 and 1988 under the Internal Security Act.
One for social activism and two for agreeing to represent political appointees. Id. Human rights
lawyers also have been detained in Kenya, see Center For The Independence Of Judges And
Lawyers, Kenya, CUL BULL., Apr.-Oct. 1987, at 7-8; Syria, see Center For The Independence
Of Judges And Lawyers, Syria, in id. at 13-14; and in Ghana, see Center For The Independence
Of Judges And Lawyers, Ghana, CUL BULL., Oct. 1989, at 3-4.
395. A Moroccan lawyer was charged with an offense against "'sacred institutions'" based upon
his allegedly blasphemous plea on behalf of a student client. See Center For The Independence
Of Lawyers And Judges, Morocco, CJIL BULL., Apr. 1988, at 11. A Paraguayan lawyer who
represented street vendors whom the local government wanted to evict from the market area was
charged with two counts of incitement to violence based upon his leading a demonstration and
organizing a student music festival. See Center For The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers,
Paraguay id. at 11-12.
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associations have been suspended or abolished, and the leadership and other
prominent lawyers have been subjected to criminal prosecution or disciplin-
ary proceedings.'
In August 1989, the Centre For The Independence Of Judges And
Lawyers published a report on the harassment and persecution of judges and
lawyers. The report listed 145 judges and lawyers who had been harassed,
detained or killed in thirty-one countries since 1988. This included thirty-
five lawyers who had been killed, thirty-seven detained and thirty-eight who
had been attacked or threatened with violence over the preceding eighteen
months.' In August 1990, the Centre reported that 430 judges and
lawyers had been killed, detained or harassed in forty-four countries between
July 1989 and June 1990. This total included sixty-seven lawyers and judges
who had been killed, 167 who had been detained, forty who had been
attacked and sixty-seven who had received threats.' In 1990, the Com-
mission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council adopted
resolution 1990/33 in which it expressed consternation over the "continued
harassment and persecution of judges and lawyers in many countries."'
The Commission called upon governments to respect the independence of the
judiciary and to ensure the protection of practicing lawyers, prosecutors and
judges against "undue restrictions and pressures in the exercise of their func-
tions.""1
B. The Judiciary And The Protection Of Human Rights
An independent judiciary is central to the maintenance of a limited,
democratic government which respects human rights. It is charged with
insuring that the other branches of government do not exceed their constitut-
ed powers and abuse individual rights. The judiciary also stands as a barrier
against the tides of public opinion, popular panic and political self-interest.
It thus is vital that the judiciary remain free of partisan sympathy and
maintain its independence from political control. The legal profession
performs a complimentary role. The profession is the advocate of the weak,
396. See Center For The Independence Of Lawyers And Judges, Hai CUL BULL., Oct. 1988,
at 5. Maitre Lafontant Joseph, lawyer and Executive Director of the Center for Promotion on
Human Rights, was found murdered in his automobile on July 11, 1988. He was a leading
human rights activist in Haiti, who provided legal assistance to peasants and workers and co-
founded the Haitian League For Human Rights. Id. See generally Amnesty International,
Philippines: The Killing And Intimidation Of Human Rights Lawyers, in IL BULL., Oct. 1988,
at 40. In the last two years of the Marcos government four Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) lawyers were assassinated. FLAG provided free legal assistance to political prisoners
and to disadvantaged groups. Id. at 40.
397. Judicial Independence and Impartiality, supra note 388, at 10. See generally id. at 11.
398. First Report, supra note 382, at 16.
399. Second Report, supra note 382, at 15.
400. 46 Commission On Human Rights Res. 1990/33 (XXXXVI), ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at 91,
U.N. Doe E/1990/22 E/CN.4/1990/94.
401. Id.
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vulnerable and disenfranchised. A vigorous legal profession is vital for
insuring that the government remains a servant of the law rather than of
those who populate political office.'
The preamble to the United Nations Charter proclaims the organization's
determination "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can
be maintained."' Clearly, one "condition" for a just society is an inde-
pendent and impartial judiciary. The Statute of the International Court of
Justice, the legal arm of the United Nations, specifically provides that the
Court shall be composed of "independent judges'" elected from among
persons of "high moral character" who possess the qualifications required in
their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial office.'
Every member of the Court shall, before assuming office, make a "solemn
declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously."'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the foundation human
rights instrument, contains several provisions which recognize the importance
of an independent and impartial judiciary." Article 8 states that everyone
has the right to an "effective remedy" before a competent national tribunal
for acts which are violative of fundamental human rights.4 Article 10
proclaims that everyone is entitled in "full equality" to a "fair and public
hearing" by an "independent and impartial tribunal" in the determination of
their rights and obligations and in the adjudication of any criminal charge
which is lodged against them.'
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reiterates and
elaborates upon these provisions." Article 14 provides that defendants
facing a criminal charge shall be entitled to a "fair and public hearing" by
a "competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.""'
402. See generally IC7 Conference On The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers, CUL Bull.,
April 1989.
403. U.N. CHARTER preamble, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 U.N.Y.B.
1043 (done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945) (entered into
force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945).
404. U.N. CHARTER, Statute Of The International Court of Justice, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052 (done at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; entered
into force, Oct. 24 1945) (entered into force for the United States, Oct. 24, 1945).
405. Id. at. 20. See also arts. 17, 24.
406. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 21 Sess., U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967) (opened for signature, Dec. 1966; entered into
force, Mar. 23, 1976) (signed by the United States, Dec. 31, 1979).
407. Id. art. 8.
408. Id. art. 10.
409. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A16316 (1967) (opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966;
entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976) (signed by the United States, Dec. 31, 1979).
410. Id. art. 14(1).
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In addition to providing for an exhaustive set of due process rights," the
Covenant provides that individuals shall have the right to have their
conviction and sentence reviewed by a "higher tribunal according to
law."41 Regional human rights instruments, such as the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, 13 the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms"' and the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, 15 embody similar provisions. Various
international human rights instruments also stress that individuals should be
guaranteed equal access to the courts and equal justice under law."16
These instruments thus recognize that an independent and impartial
judiciary and aggressive legal profession is vital to the fair administration of
justice and to the protection of human rights. Yet, little progress has been
made towards the drafting and adoption of a binding multilateral instrument
which provides international protection for the autonomy of judges and
lawyers.
C. Towards The International Protection Of Judicial
Independence And Impartiality
In 1985, the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders adopted the Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary.'"7 It invited governments to implement the
principles "taking into account the political, economic, social and cultural
circumstances and traditions of each country.""" It also urged regional and
international bodies to become involved in implementing the principles." 9
The preamble to the Basic Principles recognizes that the United Nations
Charter, as well as various human rights instruments, provide for the right
to a fair and impartial trial. It goes on to note that there frequently is a gap
between the vision underlying these principles and the situation within
411. Id. arts. 14-17.
412. Id. art. 14(5).
413. American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 8, 52-55, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at 1,
OEA/Ser. L./V/II.23 doe. rev. 2 (done November 22, 1969; entered into force, July 18, 1978).
414. European Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms,
arts. 8, 39, Euop. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950; entered into
force, Sept. 3, 1953).
415. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 7, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/ 3
Rev. 5 (done at Banjul, June 26, 1981; entered into force, Oct. 21, 1986).
416. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, arts.
5, 5(a), 660 U.N.T.S. (done at New York, Mar. 7, 1966; entered into force, Jan. 4, 1969). See
also Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, arts. 16, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (done
at New York, Sept. 28, 1954; entered into force, June 6, 1960).
417. Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, at 58, U.N. Do. A/CONF.121/22/Trb.1, U.N. Sales No. R/86.IV.1 (1985)
[hereinafter United Nations Congress].
418. Id.
419. Id. at 59.
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particular countries.' This creates a particularly serious threat to human
rights since judges typically possess the "ultimate decision over life,
freedom, rights, duties and property of citizens." 421
The first section addresses the subject of judicial independence. The first
paragraph requires that the independence of the judiciary should be
guaranteed and enshrined in law.' The judiciary is charged by the Basic
Principles with deciding the matters before them impartially, on the basis of
facts and in accordance with law, without "any restrictions, improper
influences, inducements, pressures threats or interferences, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason."423 Nor should judicial decisions be
subject to revision or review by political authorities.4u The Principles also
require that the judiciary should have exclusive authority over whether an
issue submitted for decision lies within its jurisdiction.4' This provision
presumably is designed to prevent the political branches from insulating
themselves from accountability by removing certain matters from judicial
cognizance. The judiciary also is required to ensure that legal proceedings
are conducted "fairly" and that the "rights of the parties are respected."'
Paragraph Five prohibits the establishment of tribunals which do not use the
"duly established procedures of the legal process" and which are "created to
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribu-
nals." 4' This provision appears to be designed to prevent regimes from
creating extraordinary military and special courts and religious tribunals to
prosecute political dissidents and members of minority ethnic, minority and
religious groups. Paragraph Seven states that it is the duty of each State to
provide "adequate resources" to the judiciary so that it is able to "properly
perform its functions." 4I This clause appears to be designed to provide the
judiciary with the resources which are required to process its caseload.
Inadequate salaries and poor working conditions also may discourage
qualified advocates from pursuing a judicial career. Paragraph Seven also
might be amended to suggest that the budget of the judicial branch should be
prepared in collaboration with the judiciary.
Two paragraphs guarantee judges certain fundamental rights. The
judiciary is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, provided that such rights are exercised in a dignified fashion.4'
420. Id.
421. Id. at 60. The preamble notes that the Basic Principles also apply to lay judges. Id.
422. Id. at 60, pam. 1.
423. Id. para. 2.
424. Id. pam. 4. This is "without prejudice to judicial review or to mitigation or commutation
by competent authorities of sentences imposed by the judiciary, in accordance with the law." Id.
425. Id. parm. 3.
426. Id. para. 6.
427. Id. para. 5.
428. Id. para. 7.
429. Id. at 61, para. 8.
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Judges also are reminded that they should not engage in conduct which is
likely to create a conflict of interest or compromise the image of the
judiciary. The Basic Principles also state that judges shall be free to form
and join associations of judges or other organizations which are organized to
promote their professional interests and to protect their independence.13
A broad provision provides that those selected for judicial office shall be
individuals of "integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications
in law.""' Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial
appointments for improper motives. States also are reminded that there
should be no discrimination in the selection of judges on the grounds of race,
color, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or status. 2 This provision impliedly recognizes that a
diverse judiciary is less likely to be dominated by a single ideology or to
maintain loyalty to particular economic or political interests. It may have
been strengthened by urging regimes to actively recruit judges from various
backgrounds. It also might be advisable to urge regimes to provide for wide
participation in the selection of judges and to take into consideration the
views of the organized bar and citizens groups. In addition, to the extent
possible, governments should be urged to appoint full-time judges who are
able to devote the necessary time and energy to the judicial enterprise.
A series of provisions seek to insulate judges from termination,
demotion, transfer or other sanctions on account of their judicial decisions
or activities. Paragraph Eleven seeks to shield judges from economic
pressure by requiring that the judges' remuneration, conditions of service,
pensions and age of retirement should be "adequately secured by law. " '
Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure until a
mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office.' Their
promotion, to the extent possible, should be based on "objective fac-
tors."' Regimes also should be prohibited from transferring judges or
taking any other punitive action as a result of their decisions or judicial
philosophy. Paragraph Fourteen requires that the assignment of cases to
various judges should be an "internal matter of judicial administration."'
This clause guards against political efforts to see to it that significant cases
are assigned to sympathetic judges.
Paragraph Fifteen provides that judges shall be bound by professional
secrecy with regard to their deliberations and shall not be required to reveal
430. Id. pam. 9.
431. Id. pam. 10.
432. Id.
433. Id. pam. 11.
434. Id. pam. 12.
435. Id. at 62, pam. 13.
436. Id. at 61, pam. 14.
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confidential information. 7 This provision protects judges against being
called before investigative tribunals and being compelled to justify or to
explain their decisions or to reveal the contents of their deliberations. Judges
also are to be guaranteed personal immunity from civil suit. This, however,
does not preclude grievants from seeking to bring judges before disciplinary
panels or lodging a legal action against the state.' Civil immunity
protects judges against harassment and frivolous suits. It also permits judges
to make difficult and controversial decisions without fear of being subject to
suit by aggrieved parties. Judges presumably remain vulnerable to criminal
prosecution.
The final section provides that any charge or complaint which is made
against a judge in his or her judicial and professional capacity shall be
processed efficiently and fairly under established procedures.' Disciplin-
ary decisions also generally should be subject to independent review.'
Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of
incapacity or behavior that renders them "unfit to discharge their du-
ties."" ' Regimes also should be required to insure that these disciplinary
panels are comprised of a diversity of examiners who possess competency in
judicial ethics and cannons of behavior.
In resolution 40/32, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the
resolutions adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. 2 A month later, on
December 13, 1985, the General Assembly specifically called attention to the
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and invited govern-
ments "to respect them and to take them into account within the framework
of their national legislation and practice."' It also urged that continued
attention should be devoted to studying the topic of judicial independence and
impartiality. 4
On May 24, 1989, The Economic and Social Council adopted Proce-
dures for the Effective Implementation of the Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary.' Procedure One requires all States to
"adopt and implement" the Basic Principles "in accordance with their
437. Id. pam. 15.
438. Id. pam. 16.
439. Id. at 62, pains. 17, 19.
440. Id. pam. 20.
441. Id. pam. 18.
442. G.A. Res. 40/32 (XXXX), 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 204, U.N. Doe. A/40/881.
443. G.A. Rcs. 40/146 (XXXX), 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 254, U.N. Doe.
A/4011007.
444. Id. See also G.A. Res. 41/149 (XXXXI), 41 GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 200,
A/41/874/Add. 1.
445. ESCOR Res. 1989/60 (XXXXIII), U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 46, U.N. Doe.
E/1989/91.
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constitutional process and domestic practice." ' The Procedures go on to
proclaim that no judge shall be required to act in a fashion which is
inconsistent with the Basic Principles. In addition, no judge shall accept an
appointment or act in a fashion which is inconsistent with the Principles."
The remainder of the Procedures establish mechanisms for publicizing
and implementing the Basic Principles. The central provision admonishes
States to "pay particular attention" to the need for adequate judicial
resources, including the appointment of a sufficient number of judges in
relation to case-loads, providing the courts with the necessary support staff
and equipment and offering judges appropriate personal security, remunera-
tion and emoluments.' States also are required to disseminate the Basic
Principles," 9 promote or encourage seminars and courses' and submit
quinquennial reports informing the United Nations Secretary-General of any
progress which has been achieved in publicizing and implementing the
Principles."'1 The Secretary-General is required to insure that these
reports, along with the text of the Basic Principles, are given wide circula-
tion.12
The United Nations, through its Department of Technical Co-operation
for Development, is charged with assisting governments in establishing and
strengthening their judicial systems"s3 and in implementing the Basic Princi-
ples.' The United Nations also is to promote national and regional
seminars and to conduct research into effective measures for implementing
the Basic Principles.' On December 15, 1989, the Procedures for the
Effective Implementation of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly.'
The Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, in addition to the Principles on the Indepen-
dence of the Judiciary, adopted a resolution on the Role of Lawyers.'
The resolution recommended that "Member States should provide for
protection of practicing lawyers against undue restrictions and pressures in
446.Id. at 46, para. 1.
447. Id. para. 2.
448. Id. at 47, para. 5.
449. Id. para. 4.
450. Id. para. 6.
451. Id. at 47, para. 7.
452. Id. pamas. 9, 10.
453. Id. para. II(a).
454. Id. para. 1 (b).
455. Id. para 1 l(c)(d). The United Nations regional and interregional research and training
institutes for crime prevention and criminal justice as well as other concerned entities within the
United Nations system shall assist in the implementation process. Id. para. 12-15.
456. G.A. Res. 44/162 (XXXXIV), 44 GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 235-36, U.N. Doe. A/44/848.
457. United Nations Congress, supra note 417, at 87.
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the exercise of their functions."" 5 It also requested the Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders to
consider how to improve the delivery of legal services, guarantee equal
access to the legal system and provide protection for lawyers throughout the
world.' The Eighth United Nations Congress adopted the Basic Principles
On the Role of Lawyers.' This document recognizes that all persons are
entitled to the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect and establish
their rights and to defend them. 1 Governments are obligated to ensure
that all persons have equal access to legal services' and that they are in-
formed of their right to an attorney.'
Most importantly, governments are obligated to ensure that lawyers are
able to perform their professional functions without "intimidation, hindrance,
harassment or improper interference."' Attorneys shall not be subjected
to criminal, administrative or economic sanctions based on actions undertak-
en pursuant to their professional obligations.' They should be free to
consult with their clients' and governments should safeguard them against
threats and retribution.' They "shall not be identified with their clients
or their clients' causes as a result of discharging their functions."'
Lawyers, like other citizens, are entitled to freedom of expression, associa-
tion and assembly' and should be free to form and join professional
associations to represent their interests.' ° Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers charged with violations of their professional code of conduct are to
proceed in accordance with due process procedures.471
On December 14, 1990, the United Nations General Assembly welcomed
the instruments and resolutions adopted by the Eighth Congress and invited
Governments to be guided by them in the "formulation of appropriate legisla-
tion and policy directives."' Four days later, the General Assembly
specifically welcomed the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers and
458. Id. at 88.
459. Id. at 87-88.
460. United Nations Basic Principles On The Role Of Lawyers, reprinted in CUIL BUll,
April-Oct. 1990, at 27 (Special Issue on The Independence Of Judges And Lawyers: A
Compilation Of International Standards).
461. Id. at 32, para. 1.
462. Id. paras. 2-3.
463. Id. at 32-33, paras. 4-8.
464. Id. at 35, para. 16(a).
465. Id. pama. 16(c).
466. Id. pama. 16(c).
467. Id. para. 17.
468. Id. para. 18.
469. Id. at 36, para. 23.
470. Id. para. 24.
471. Id. at 37, paras. 26-29.
472. G.A. Res. 45/121 (XXXXV), CAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 223-24, U.N. Doc. A/45/756.
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invited Governments to "respect them and to take them into account within
the framework of their national legislation and practice."473
D. Towards A Declaration On Judicial Independence
The pluralism of political systems throughout the world complicates any
international effort to protect the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. Nevertheless, the Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary are an unprecedented multilateral effort to safeguard judicial
integrity. It is now time to incorporate the Basic Principles into a binding
declaration which is open to signature and ratification by States.474 The
protection of judges, of course, cannot guarantee fair and equal justice. The
conservatism of elite judges and their identification with the prevailing power
structure may incline the judiciary to uphold the status quo. Judges thus may
have a tendency to resolve economic and political conflicts in favor of
established interests.475 As a partial antidote, judges should be reminded
that they are obligated to respect internationally guaranteed human rights.
It should be stressed that this obligation is not abrogated by the declaration
of a state of emergency.476
The Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary should be expanded
to include a protocol setting forth judicial duties as well as rights. Judges
throughout the world should be asked to pledge to uphold internationally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Judges also should be
reminded that they are required to adhere to accepted cannons of interpreta-
tion and should not compromise universally accepted principles such as the
prohibition on ex post facto laws.4' It should be clearly proclaimed that
contemporary judges, like their German colleagues, are criminally liable for
the commission of international crimes.' Non-governmental organiza-
tions, such as international legal organizations, also should be urged to
closely monitor the actions of judges, protesting their acquiescence in
473. G.A. Rcs. 45/166, GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 279, U.N. Doe. A/45/838.
474. See generally Draft Declaration On The Independence And Impartiality Of The Judiciary,
Juros And Assessors And The Independence Of Lawyers, 40 Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/20/Add. 1.
475. See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN
TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988).
476. States of emergency pose a threat to human rights. International instruments permit the
suspension of a wide array of rights during duly declared public emergencies which threaten the
life of the nation. See International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, supra note 409, art.
4.
477. The Basic Principles On The Role Of Lawyers sets forth various duties and responsibilities
of lawyers. See The United Nations Basic Principles On The Role Of Lawyers, supra note 460,
at 34-35, paras. 12-15.
478. See generally United Nations Congress, supra note 417, par. 16.
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violation of human rights and intervening to guarantee their protection.4'
CONCLUSION
The events in Nazi Germany vividly illustrate the importance of
preserving the independence and impartiality of judges and lawyers. The
politicalization of the legal process in Germany led to the perversion of the
rule of law. The ranks of advocates and judges were purged of progressives
and Jews; conventional cannons of interpretation and jurisprudential
principles were discarded; and extraordinary tribunals displaced established
courts. The judiciary acquiesced in the use of extra-judicial punishment and
responded to political pressures in the adjudication of cases. In the end, the
legal process was transformed into an instrument of raw repression and
discrimination.
A number of the judges and lawyers who were responsible for designing
and implementing the Nazi's policies were brought to the bar of international
justice following the end of the war. An American tribunal proclaimed that
those judges who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot
drape themselves in the immunity traditionally accorded to those who
populate the judicial office. These legal officers and officials thus owe their
ultimate fealty to internationally proclaimed principles of justice rather than
to the ephemeral dictates of domestic law.
Nazi Germany, of course, was an extreme example of the perils
presented by the politicalization of the judiciary and the legal profession.
Judges and lawyers remain under varying degrees of threat throughout the
world. Yet, the international community has been astonishing slow to
guarantee the independence of the judiciary. Human rights and equal justice
cannot be achieved without a strong and vigorous judiciary.
The existing documents, while well conceived, are not legally binding.
Hopefully, the next generation of human rights instruments will include a
Declaration on the Independence of the Judiciary.
479. Non-governmental organizations have intervened on behalf of lawyers. See Judicial
Independence And Impartiality, supra note 388, at 15-16.
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